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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Although Mr. Sunniville's appeal brief contains a statement of the issues, the
statement does not include any standards of appellate review, as required by Rule 24(a)(5)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jordan Credit Union therefore restates the
issues, and sets forth the applicable standards of review, as follows.
Issue 1: Did the lower court properly consider Mr. Suniville's memorandum in
opposition (styled "Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and
opposing response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment")?
Standard of Review: A ruling on whether to strike (or ignore) an untimely
memorandum is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 UT App 541,
f 9, 127 P.3d 1256. ("'A ruling thereon, except under circumstances which amount to a
clear abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.'" Pratt, citing Adams v.
Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 651 (1937).)
Issue 2: Was Mr. Suniville entitled to the appointment of counsel in a civil case,
or, in the alternative, to stay the civil proceedings against him for over a year until he was
released from prison?
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Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
See State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[W]e consider the trial
court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and review the
trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness.").
Issue 3: Did the lower court appropriately consider Mr. Suniville's otherwise
inadmissible evidence?
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the Utah Rules of Evidence
and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201.
Issue 4: Did the lower court properly conclude that Jordan Credit Union's
repossession of the vehicle was commercially reasonable?
Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is a question of law, which
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. See Johnson v.
Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, f 9, 206 P.3d 302.
Issue 5: Did the lower court properly conclude that Jordan Credit Union's
repossession and subsequent sale of the vehicle at issue to a salvage yard was commercially
reasonable?
Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is a question of law, which
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. See Johnson v.
Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, \ 9, 206 P.3d 302.
2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(l) and (2). Determination of whether conduct
was commercially reasonable.
(1) The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection,
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially reasonable manner.
(2) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner
if the disposition is made:
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market;
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the
disposition; or
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a garden-variety collection action for a deficiency owed to Jordan Credit

Union by Defendant, Harry Suniville. Specifically, Jordan loaned $12,829.00 to Mr.
Suniville in October 2005, so that he could purchase a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse. Two
years later, Jordan became aware that Mr. Suniville had been arrested for driving under
the influence, and that the vehicle had been impounded. Pursuant to the default clause in
the loan agreement between the parties, Jordan elected to repossess the vehicle (which
Jordan later discovered had been significantly damaged over time) and accelerate the debt.
After sending notice to Mr. Suniville's address of record, and after attempting to auction
the vehicle for two weeks with no bids from any prospective buyers, Jordan sold the
3

vehicle to a salvage company for $200. Jordan then sued Mr. Suniville for the deficiency,
which was $8,778.12 as of January 26, 2008.
Mr. Suniville, acting pro se, initially filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
Jordan then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, based in
part, on Mr. Suniville's failure to submit any admissible evidence in opposition to the
motion. Mr. Suniville appeals from the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order,
dated April 6, 2009.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because there is no formal statement of facts in Mr. Suniville's opening brief,
Jordan hereby recites the undisputed facts, as relied upon by the trial court, as follows:
(Hereafter, all citations to the Record shall be "R. at
1.

.")

On or about October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville executed a Retail Installment

Contract and Security Agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement") in connection with the
purchase of a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse (hereinafter the "Collateral"). (R. at 119, f A\see
Exhibit C attached hereto.)
2.

On or about December 3,2007, Mr. Suniville was arrested for driving under

the influence and the Collateral was impounded. (R. at 34; R. at 128; Ex. C.)
3.

A notice dated December 3,2007 was sent to Jordan from the Utah State Tax

Commission stating that the Collateral had been impounded. (R. at 128; Ex. C.)
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4.

Mr. Suniville was in default under the Agreement due to his failure to keep

the Collateral in his possession and because Jordan now believed, in good faith, that Mr.
Suniville would not be able to continue to perform his obligations under the Agreement.
(R. at 126; R. at 119 f 7; Ex. C.)
5.

After the Collateral had been in impound for one week, and to protect its

interests, Jordan elected to repossess the Collateral, retrieving it from the impound lot on
December 10, 2007. (R. at 119, f 7; Ex. C.)
6.

Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation

under the Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not
or could not be performed, is considered a default. (R. at 126, Section "Default"; Ex. C.)
7.

Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several

remedies listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any
fees incurred and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount),
repossession and sale of the collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts
left owing after the sale, including attorney's fees. {Id.)
8.

On or about December 11, 2007, Jordan sent a letter to Mr. Suniville, at the

address he provided, stating that the Collateral had been repossessed due to the impound
action. The letter explained that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00
and had been added to the loan balance. The letter further stated that the debt had been
accelerated and directed Mr. Suniville to pay to Jordan the entire loan balance of
5

$9,312.37 on or before December 20, 2007. The letter also stated that failure to do so
would result in Jordan's sale of the Collateral and that Mr. Suniville would be liable for
any deficiency between the sale price and the loan balance. (R. at 130; Ex. C.)
9.

Jordan received no subsequent communicationfromMr. Sunniville. Hence,

the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, as is usual and
customary in the industry. (R. at 120, % 12; Ex. C.)
10.

Jordan received no bids on the Collateral due to its condition. (Id.)

11.

In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the

vehicle to a mechanic, Ken Martinez, for inspection and evaluation. (R. at 120, f 13; R.
at 134, ff 4-5; see Ex. C and Ex. D attached hereto.)
12.

The inspection showed that the vehicle had not been kept in good condition

and repair as required by the Agreement. There were many issues, both aesthetic and
mechanical, that required extensive parts and labor to correct. An estimate prepared by
Ken Martinez on January 12, 2008, indicates that the vehicle required more than
$2,500.00 in body work. (R. at 134 iff 6-7; R. at 136; Ex. D.)
13.

At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues

related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive
damage to the vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car
sellable, the only commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the
Collateral as salvage. At that point, Jordan had received no offers to purchase the vehicle.
6

Furthermore, Jordan's inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated that even if the
necessary repairs were performed, the wholesale value of the vehicle would only be about
$3,500.00. In Jordan's experience, sales after repossession generally only bring
approximately wholesale value, or slightly less. (R. at 120, % 14; Ex. C.)
14.

After considering these factors, and after receiving no communication from

Mr. Suniville, Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer it
received, which was for $200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc.. Jordan sold the
vehicle to Midvale All Small Auto on or about January 17, 2008. R. at 121, f 15; R. at
152, f 5; see Ex. C and Ex. G attached hereto.)
15.

After the disposition of the Collateral, Jordan sent a letter to Mr. Suniville

at his record address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after
applying the sale proceeds to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus
collection costs, attorney fees and interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of
January 26, 2008. (R. at 121, f 16; Ex. C.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

MR. SUNIVILLE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to

marshal the evidence against him and meticulously demonstrate how the evidence does not
support the factual findings of the trial court. Mr. Suniville did not marshal the evidence
or show that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous and lacking in support.
7

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED MR. SUNIVILLE'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION.
Although the trial court concluded that Mr. Suniville's memorandum in opposition

was untimely, the court nevertheless considered all of the arguments and documents Mr.
Suniville submitted, including Mr. Suniville's memorandum in opposition, as demonstrated
in the court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The trial court properly ruled against
Mr. Suniville after considering all of his documents and arguments.
III.

MR. SUNIVILLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
NOR TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS.
The trial court properly denied Mr. Suniville's request for appointment of an

attorney, as a civil litigant has no right to court-appointed counsel. Furthermore, the trial
court properly declined to stay the proceedings for over a year pending Mr. Suniville's
release from prison.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND DISCOUNTED MR.
SUNIVILLE'S INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE.
Mr. Suniville failed to meet his burden under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure. None of the purported evidence he submitted to the trial court was admissible.
The trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of Jordan Credit
Union.
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V.

JORDAN WAS WITHIN ITS RIGHTS TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE
FOLLOWING MR. SUNIVILLE'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION.
Mr. Suniville defaulted under the terms of the Agreement between the parties

because he lost possession of the vehicle as a result of his incarceration. Mr. Suniville
further breached the Agreement by not keeping the vehicle in good condition or repair.
Jordan was therefore within its contractual rights to repossess the vehicle.
VI.

JORDAN'S DISPOSITION OF THE VEHICLE WAS COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE.
Jordan materially complied with the obligations imposed by the loan and security

agreement as well as the Utah Commercial Code for disposition of repossessed collateral.
Notice was properly given, despite a harmless error concerning Jordan's notice of the
anticipated sale of the vehicle. The sale was to a third party in an arms length transaction,
with no self dealing, in a manner recognized for this type of collateral. Thus, the sale was
for commercially reasonable.
VII. JORDAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL.
Jordan is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to the
Agreement between the parties, and in accordance with Utah law.

9

ARGUMENT
I. MR. SUMVILLE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Although, strictly speaking, the granting of summary judgment is a question of law,
it is clear from Mr. Suniville's brief that he hotly contests the finding of facts that
undergird the lower court's ruling. Specifically, Mr. Suniville wants to dispute whether
the Court correctly accounted for the condition of the vehicle at the time Jordan sold it to
the salvage yard. Mr. Suniville further attempts to dispute whether Jordan gave adequate
notice of its intentions after it repossessed the car, and whether the sale of the car was
commercially reasonable at all. The problem is that Mr. Suniville failed to put any
admissible evidence in front of the trial court that might have created a dispute of material
fact. Mr. Suniville now has a similar problem on appeal, in that he has failed to marshal
the evidence, much less identify any fatal flaw in the lower court's reasoning.
It is the duty of the appellant challenging a factual finding to marshal the evidence
that supports the challenged finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); See also Wardley Better
Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, if 14, 61 P.3d 1009. The appellant must
then demonstrate that, even with this evidence, the findings of fact are clearly erroneous
and lacking in support. Hill v. Estate of Alfred, 216 P.3d 929, 943 (Utah 2009). Mr.
Suniville has failed to meet his obligation to show that thefindingsof the trial court were
erroneous and that the grant of summary judgment was therefore against the great weight
of the evidence. Consequently, the findings of fact (as set forth in the "Background"
10

section of the lower court's Memorandum Decision and Order) are presumed to be correct.
See Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 106, 1 31, 977 P.2d 1209.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED MR. SUNIVILLE'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION.
Mr. Suniville suggests that the trial court improperly failed to consider his
memorandum in opposition because the trial court believed that it was untimely. For the
record, Jordan concedes that it received Mr. Suniville's memorandum in a timely fashion
after filing its motion for summary judgment. For whatever reason, the memo in
opposition was not filed with the court (or, at least it was not stamped in) until January 5,
2009, approximately one month after Mr. Suniville mailed the memorandum to counsel
for Jordan.1 (See R. at 175; See Ex. E.)
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the court concluded that the memorandum
in opposition was untimely. (R. at 232; See Ex. A.) Nevertheless, the court went on to
consider all of the arguments and documents that Mr. Suniville had submitted, just as the
court said it would do during oral argument. (R. at 232-235; see Ex. A. See also R. at
283, page 19, lines 22-23.) Those arguments included: (a) whether Mr. Suniville was
current with his car payments; (b) whether Jordan had given adequate notice of the sale;
*Not all of Mr. Suniville's opposing documents were filed on time, however.
The unsigned affidavits of Ron Hinckley (Mr. Suniville's prison caseworker) and
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, together with a Notice Regarding Newr Evidence,
were not filed until late February, 2009, nearly three months after Mr. Suniville sent
his memorandum in opposition to counsel for Jordan, and well after his deadline to file
a response to Jordan's motion for summary judgment. (See R. at 210 and 225.)
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and (c) whether the vehicle was in working condition when it was repossessed. (R. at 233235; see Ex. A.) After considering all of that, the court concluded that Mr. Suniville's
opposition was "substantively lacking" and ruled against him anyway.2 (Id.) The
argument that the court failed to consider Mr. Suniville's memorandum is without merit.
i n . MR. SUNIVILLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
NOR TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. Suniville next argues that the trial court should not have denied his request for
appointed counsel or to stay of the proceedings until his releasefromprison, scheduled for
March 23, 2010. (See Appellant's Brief, at 8.) Again, this argument is without merit.
Mr. Suniville is not entitled to have counsel appointed for him in a civil matter. See State
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354 (Utah, 1993) ("We note that Defendant has no right to
counsel in a civil case"). Furthermore, the court informed Mr. Suniville from the
beginning of the case that choosing to represent himself would come with certain
consequences and he chose to proceed on his own anyway. (See R. at 56.) That was his
choice, and it is his problem. The court properly denied the motion to appoint counsel.

2

The trial court concluded that the evidence Mr. Suniville offered consisted of
"hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions, and irrelevancies." (R. at 233; see Ex. A.) To
illustrate, Mr. Suniville submitted: (1) the unsigned affidavit of his prison caseworker
(R. at 210; see Ex. H.); (2) the affidavit of Shannon Weirick, who is the wife of a
mechanic who had reportedly performed work on the car (R. at 225, see Ex. J); and (3)
various other documents offered with no foundation or basis for admission (R. at 84101).
12

The court also correctly denied Mr. Suniville's request to stay the proceedings for
over a year until he was released from prison. There was and remains no legal basis for
his request to stay the proceedings. While Mr. Suniville's current housing situation is
lamentable, it is nonetheless one of his own making. Allowing this matter to sit on the
trial court's calendar for over a year would have resulted in undue delay and prejudice to
Jordan Credit Union. Thus, the Court properly denied the request to stay the proceedings.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND DISCOUNTED MR.
SUNIVILLE'S INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE.
Mr. Suniville next argues that the court ignored "pivotal and key evidence." (See,
e.g., Appellant's Brief, at 9.) This argument is without merit. Again, the court states in
its Memorandum Decision and Order that it considered Mr. Suniville's submissions,
generally, and specifically referred to the unsigned affidavit of Mr. Suniville's prison
caseworker, who speculated that the car must have been functional when Mr. Suniville was
arrested. (R. at 233-35; see Ex. A.) The problem is that none of Mr. Suniville's
purported evidence was admissible.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
13

upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing tofilesuch a response.
(Emphasis added.)
None of Mr. Suniville's purported evidence rose to the level of creating a dispute of
material fact for the purposes of Rule 56(e). Not only did Mr. Suniville fail to submit
signed affidavits, the purported testimony in the affidavits was speculative, contained
hearsay, or was without foundation altogether. {See R. at 210, 225; see Ex's H and J.)
Take for example, the Affidavit signed by Shannon Weirick.3 (R. at 225; Ex. J.)
Ms. Weirick is the wife of the mechanic who allegedly worked on the vehicle a few
months prior to its repossession. Ms. Weirick had no personal knowledge concerning the
inspection of the vehicle. Hence, her testimony is inadmissible hearsay. (See Utah R.
Evidence, Rules 802, 803, and 804.) The unsigned affidavit of Ron Hinckley also contains
hearsay and opinion testimony concerning a portion of a report that he did not produce
describing events to which he was not present. (R. at 210; Ex. H.) Finally, Mr. Suniville
wanted the court to consider other documents, such as value and repair estimates, that
were submitted without any hint of authentication or foundation, and were not attached to
any sworn testimony at all. (See R. at 84-101, 220.) Mr. Suniville cannot ignore the
basic, fundamental rules of evidence and civil procedure, and expect to create a dispute
3

The unsigned affidavit appears in its entirety in the Record at 225. The
signature page, which is only signed by Mrs. Weirick, appears in the Record at 221.
(See Ex. I.)
14

of material fact for the purposes of Rule 56 - much less prevail on any of his claims or
defenses. More importantly, Mr. Suniville cannot accuse the lower court of ignoring
pivotal and key evidence, when he did not put any admissible evidence before the court
in the first place.
V. JORDAN WAS WITHIN ITS RIGHTS TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE
FOLLOWING MR. SUNIVILLE'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION.
Next, Mr. Suniville essentially argues that Jordan breached the loan agreement by
repossessing the vehicle at issue solely as a result of Mr. Suniville's incarceration. Again,
Mr. Suniville is wrong. The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement, which
Mr. Suniville signed on October 5, 2005, requires Mr. Suniville to keep the vehicle in his
possession and in good condition and repair." (R. at 125-26, see "Ownership and Duties
Toward Property", paragraph D; Ex. C.) He was also required to keep the vehicle at the
address listed on page 1 of the Agreement, unless otherwise agreed in writing. (Id.) The
Agreement goes on to say that Mr. Suniville will be in default if he fails to perform any
obligation set forth in the Agreement, or Jordan believes in good faith that he cannot or
will not perform his obligations. (Id., see "Default".) In the event of default, the
Agreement gives Jordan the right to immediately repossess the vehicle.

(Id., see

"Remedies", paragraph D; Ex. C.)
Mr. Suniville breached the Agreement when the vehicle was impounded as a result
of his arrest for driving under the influence. (See R. at 128; Ex. C.) Because of these
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events, the vehicle was no longer stored at Mr. Suniville's address, and he no longer had
possession of the vehicle. Mr. Suniville further breached the Agreement by failing to keep
the vehicle in good condition and repair. (See R. at 133-137; Ex. D.) Jordan was
therefore within its contractual rights to repossess the vehicle.
VI. JORDAN'S DISPOSITION OF THE VEHICLE WAS COMMERCIALLY

REASONABLE.
In addition, despite Mr. Suniville's arguments to the contrary, Jordan's subsequent
sale of the vehicle was commercially reasonable, and was consistent with the requirements
of the Uniform Commercial Code as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-601 et. seq.
After default, a secured party is allowed to take possession of collateral securing a debt.
(See U.C. A. § 70A-9a-609.) Following repossession the secured party may dispose of the
collateral by commercially reasonable means. (See U.C. A. § 70A-9a-610.) If the sale is
commercially reasonable, the "secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private
proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place
and on any terms." Id. Whether a sale is commercially reasonable depends upon whether
the sale is made, "(1) in the usual manner on any recognized market, (2) at the price
current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition, or (3) otherwise in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property
that was the subject of the disposition." (U.C.A. § 70A-9a-627(2).)
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A pre-requisite to the disposition is notice to the debtor of the repossession and
intended disposition of the collateral. (See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-611.) This notice must
contain the information set forth in U.C.A. § 70A-9a-614. Then a creditor may dispose
of the collateral and apply the proceeds of the sale first to the costs of sale and
repossession, second to the loan balance owed to the creditor, and finally to any
subordinate security interests. (See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-615.) The debtor is then entitled
to proceeds in excess of the loan amount or is liable for any deficiency. Id. When
disposing of collateral, the creditor has an obligation to secure the best possible price, but
is under no obligation to use extraordinary means to obtain that price. Chrysler Dodge
Country, U.S.A, Inc., v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Jordan notified Mr. Suniville of the repossession of the vehicle by way of a letter,
dated December 11, 2007, that was sent to the address listed on the first page of the
Agreement. (See R. at 125,130.) Having notified Mr. Suniville of the acceleration of the
debt and that the car would be sold after December 20, 2007, if he had not paid the loan
in full, and having received no communication from Mr. Suniville thereafter, Jordan
proceeded to market the car for sale as is, but received no offers. (R. at 120, 11 11-12;
Ex. C.) Jordan had the vehicle examined by a mechanic who determined that it required
in excess of $2,500 in repairs. (R. at 120,1113-14; Ex. C. See also R. at 133-137; Ex.
A.) Jordan decided that it would likely not recoup that expense in a later sale and elected
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to sell the car for the best price it could get. (R. at 120, f 14; Ex. C.) Jordan was offered
$200 and accepted the offer on January 17, 2008. (R. at 120, f 15; Ex. C.)
Jordan's disposition of the vehicle was commercially reasonable under these
circumstances, especially considering that the vehicle needed thousands of dollars of repair
work. Requiring Jordan to expend thousands of dollars with no guarantee of recouping
those funds, either through the sale or by adding them to the loan balance and seeking the
deficiency, is an extreme measure that Jordan is not required to take under the Chrysler
Dodge opinion. See Chrysler Dodge, at 541.
Nevertheless, Mr. Suniville attempts to dispute elements of the sale, specifically that
the notice letter Jordan sent to him on December 11, 2007, only gave nine days's notice
of Jordan's intent to advertise the vehicle for sale, instead of ten days, as required by the
Agreement. (See R. at 126, "Remedies," paragraph E; Ex. C.) It is true that the
Agreement provides that a notice of disposition would be sent no less than 10 days prior
to any intended sale. And Jordan concedes that the letter provided only nine days' notice.
However, the trial court correctly held that this was a harmless error because even if the
extra day had been given, it would not have mattered as Mr. Suniville was still
incarcerated and would not have received it in any case. (R. at 234; Ex. A.) In addition,
the actual sale did not take place until January 17, 2008, more than five weeks after the
date of the letter. (R. at 120, f 15; Ex. C.) The lack of a Ml 10 day notice of the
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intended sale was an immaterial breach, if a breach at all, and resulted in no harm to Mr.
Suniville.
Finally, Mr. Suniville repeatedly raises the issue of the blue book value of his car.
Although valuation is not an element of determining the commercial reasonableness of a
sale, both parties nevertheless introduced printouts from online vehicle evaluators as
evidence of the value of the car at the time of the sale. (R. at 99-102 and 132; Ex. C.)
Jordan introduced its valuation by way of a sworn affidavit, while Mr. Suniville did not.
(R. at 118, 132; Ex's B and C.) Ignoring the admissibility issue, Mr. Suniville's valuation
greatly overestimates the value of his car by using values that did not account for the
damage to the car. The car was not in excellent condition, as Mr. Suniville would have
the Court believe. Based on the descriptions in the condition ratings, the car was in fair
condition, at best, if not poor condition, putting the value between $3,000 and $4,000.
The battle of competing estimates is moot, however, because Jordan could not find a single
buyer in the wholesale community, that was willing to purchase the car in its damaged
state. (R. at 120, f 121; Ex. C.) Thus, the payment of $200 by the salvage yard is an
accurate reflection of the fair market value of the vehicle.
The trial court found that the diminished value of the car, together with the reduced
sales prices at the auction and the extreme cost of making the car appealable to a buyer
justified Jordan's decision to forgo the repairs and seek the best price it could get, as is.
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Mr. Suniville produced no admissible facts to dispute this finding or to show that it was
in error. This Court should do the same.
VII. JORDAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL.
Jordan Credit Union hereby requests an award of the attorney's fees and costs it has
incurred on appeal pursuant to the "Default" section of the written agreement between the
parties, which says, in relevant part, "If you default, you agree to pay our costs for
collecting amounts owing, including, without limitation, court costs, attorneys' fees, and
fees for repossession, repair, storage and sale of the Property securing this Contract." (R.
at 126, "Default"; Ex. C.) Utah follows the American rule regarding attorney fees, which
dictates that fees are generally recoverable only if provided for by statute or contract.
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App 22, f 9,
177P.3d621.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed
and Mr. Suniville's appeal denied. The Court should also award Jordan its attorney's fees
and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to the written agreement between the parties.
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DATED this 4th day of November, 2009.
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
Attorneys for Appellee Jordan Credit Union

Christopher G. Jess<
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following at the address(es) indicated on the H*^ day of November, 2009.
Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

I \3\3681\579\Appeal\Appeal Brief - Suniville wpd
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

:

vs.

CASE NO. 0S0qO3840

HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Defendant.

On November 21, 2008, Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union ("JCU") submitted its Motion
for Summary Judgment. Defendant Harry Suniville filed an opposition and JCU responded.
A hearing was held March 2, 2009, and the Court took the matter under advisement. The
motion is now ready for decision.

BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville signed a Retail Installment Contract and Security
Agreement ("Contract") with JCU for the purchase of a car.

Mr. Suniville borrowed

$12,829.00 and agreed to make monthly payments, using the car as collateral. The
Contract provided that Mr. Suniville would keep the car in his possession and in good
condition and repair. It also provided that default would occur upon failure to perform a
contractual obligation, or when JCU, "in good faith, believefs] that you cannot, or will not,
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract." The Contract provided that
upon default JCU could accelerate the entire debt, repossess the car, and initiate legal
action to collect the amount left owing after the car is sold, plus collection costs, attorney
fees, court costs, towing fees, repossession costs, repairs and storage costs.
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On December 3, 2007, JCU was notified that Mr. Suniville's car had been
impounded. JCU deemed this a default under the Contract and repossessed the car. On
December 11,2007, JCU sent a letter to Mr. Suniville's address of record notifying him that
it was repossessing the car, but that in the alternative Mr. Suniville could pay off the
balance and impound fee by December 20, 2007 and retain the vehicle. Mr. Suniville did
not respond within the given time period.
JCU attempted to sell the car at auction but found no buyers. JCU's mechanic
found that the car required about $2600.00 worth of repairs, excluding necessary engine
work, but even then the car would likely sell for about $3500-$4000, yielding a slim, if any,
profit. JCU opted for the less burdensome route and on January 23, 2008 sold the car to
a junk yard for $200.00. JCU moves for summary judgment on its claims of breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, requesting the Court to order Mr. Suniville to pay $8778.12
in unpaid principal, plus impound fees, interest on the loan, and attorney fees and court
costs.
DISCUSSION
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires an opposition to a motion to
be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection on January
5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's opposition is
untimely. The Court affords pro se litigants "'every consideration that may reasonably be
indulged.'" Thompson v. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 UT App 97, *1 (unpublished) (quoting
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). Nevertheless, "[a] party who
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
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qualified member of the bar." In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, U 5, 132 P.3d 684
(citation omitted). Mr. Suniville's motions and oppositions filed with this Court lack proper
titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive.
Even if Mr. Suniville had filed a timely opposition, his objection is substantively
lacking. He has not demonstrated an issue of material fact as required to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.

His submissions are based upon hearsay, unsubstantiated

opinions, and irrelevancies. Mr. Suniville argues that he never missed a car payment, so
he has not defaulted on the contract. However, JCU based its determination of default on
the fact that the car had been in impound for a week before JCU was notified by the
impound lot and that JCU did not receive any response to the letter it sent Mr. Suniville.
That Mr. Suniville had diligently paid his monthly payments for over two years is irrelevant;
JCU reasonably concluded that Mr. Suniville had defaulted under the terms of the contract
Mr. Suniville argues that the $200.00 JCU recovered from the sale of the car was
below its actual value and that JCU failed to mitigate damages. JCU complied with the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code in its reasonable attempt to sell the repossessed car. The
statute allows a creditor to sell collateral in a "commercially reasonable manner," meaning:
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market;
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the
disposition; or
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the
disposition.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). The Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of a
repossessed car is commercially reasonable if: (1) the lender does not engage in selfdealing, (2) the debtor is given notice of the sale, and (3) the lender advertises the sale and
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gets a fair price. Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539-42
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, JCU sold the car to a junk yard, so it did not engage in selfdealing. It also gave Mr. Suniville notice by letter that it was repossessing the car and
would sell it unless Mr. Suniville paid off his loan within a given period of time. While JCU
gave Mr. Suniville one day less than the 10 days notice required by the Agreement, the
error was harmless because even if the letter had given Mr. Suniville another day, Mr.
Suniville would not have received the letter in time because it went to his mother's house
and he was incarcerated. As the court in Chrysler Dodge found in a similar fact-situation,
"there is no evidence that [the creditor] was injured by lack of notice." Id. at 541. Lastly,
JCU was required to sell the car through advertising and for a fair price. Id . The Utah
Court of Appeals held:
It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best possible
price for the benefit of the debtor. However, the secured party
does not have to use extraordinary means. . . . There is no
requirement or prohibition that the dealer must sell at
wholesale or retail, but only that the secured party obtains the
best possible price under the circumstances
"Of prime
importance, are the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair
price for the collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise
notifying potential buyers that the collateral is for sale." . . .
Public advertising is not mandatory, however.
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). JCU attempted to sell the car at auction and got no bidders.
It could have put a considerable amount of repairs into the car, but there was no guarantee
that it would recoup its investment. Under the circumstances, JCU decided to cut its losses
and get the $200.00.
Mr. Suniville argues that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether the car
was in running order at the time of impoundment on December 3, 2007. He submitted an
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unsigned affidavit from his prison caseworker, who speculates that the car must have been
functional since Mr. Suniville was arrested while driving the car. JCU's mechanic's sworn
declaration stated that the car was not running. His testimony is based upon personal
knowledge, unlike the conclusory statements submitted by Mr. Suniville.
JCU was within its rights under the Contract to find Mr. Suniville in default. A court's
determination of commercial reasonableness is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
See Chrysler Dodge, 782 P.2d. at 541. This Court has discretion to consider whether
JCU's sale of the car was reasonable. JCU had previously attempted to sell the car at
auction but had no bidders. The sale of the car for $200.00 was a fair attempt to mitigate
damages.
ORDER
As required for a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Employing these standards,
the Court determines that Mr. Suniville has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material
fact, and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this

[g

day of April, 2009.

/VA"~'"*'vV

k^ufcC,
Toomev
Judge Kate A. Toomey
District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION
TO DISMISS
Civil No. 080903840
Judge Kate Toomey

Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), by and through the undersigned
counsel of Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, hereby submits the following Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as follows:
ARGUMENT RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff requests that this renewed Motion to Dismiss be denied. Defendant previously
filed a motion to dismiss on August 29, 2008. That motion was reviewed by this Court and was

dismissed. The issue having already been reviewed and denied by this Court, Plaintiff asks the
this renewed motion also be denied. This renewed motion raises no new issues or presents any
new and relevant facts to be addressed and denial is proper. In addition, Plaintiff objects to the
entirety of Defendant's motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists
of nothing more than baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a
single piece of relevant and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible
evidence for the Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be
denied.
In the alternative, should the Court find merit in Defendant's position, Plaintiff requests
that the Court also consider the facts and argument presented below in support of summary
judgment in reviewing and ruling on the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs request is made on the
grounds of judicial economy in that the facts and argument offered in support of and favoring
summary judgment in this case also adequately and appropriately address Defendant's points and
support denial of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff believes it is prudent and an economical use of
the Court's time to avoid unnecessary duplication by filing a separate response to the motion to
dismiss.
FACTS
The following facts are established by the Complaint, attached documents and affidavits:
1.

On or about October 5, 2005, Defendant Harry Suniville executed a Retail

Installment Contract and Security Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") in connection with the
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purchase of a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse ("Collateral"), a copy of which is attached to the Affidavit
of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. (Affidavit of Michelle
Rogers, f 4).
2.

Jordan has performed all of its obligations under the Agreement. (Affidavit of

Michelle Rogers, 1 5).
3.

On or about December 3, 2007, Jordan received a notice from the Utah State Tax

Commission that the Collateral had been impounded. A true and correct copy of this notice is
attached to the Affidavit of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "B". (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 6).
4.

Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's

possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement. While the Collateral
remained impounded, storage and impound fees were continuing to accrue and Plaintiff learned
that the vehicle had extensive body damage and would not start. On the good faith belief that he
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or
about December 10, 2007. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers 1 7).
5.

Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation under the

Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be
performed, is considered a default. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 8 ; Exhibit A, Page 2,
Section "Default").
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6.

Defendant consented, by signing the Agreement, that upon default, he was liable

to Plaintiff for all collection costs, including attorney fees, court costs, and fees for towing,
repossession, repair, and storage. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 9 ; Exhibit A, Page 2, Section
"Default").
7.

Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several

remedies listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any fees
incurred and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount), repossession and sale
of the collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts left owing after the sale.
(Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 10; Exhibit A, Page 2, Section "Default").
8.

On or about December 11, 2007, a letter was sent to Defendant at the address he

provided to Jordan stating that the collateral had been repossessed due to the impound action. A
true and correct copy of this letter is attached to the Affidavit of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "C".
This letter explained that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00 and had been
added to the loan balance. The letter further stated that the debt had been accelerated and that
Defendant needed to pay to Jordan on or before December 20, 2007 the entire loan balance,
$9,312.37 and that failure to do so would result in Jordan selling the Collateral and that Defendant
would be liable for any deficiency between the sale price and the loan balance. (Affidavit of
Michelle Rogers, 1 11).
9.

When the deadline passed and Jordan had received no communication y from

Defendant, the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, the usual and
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customary procedure for the industry. Due to the damage and condition of the vehicle, there was
no interest in purchasing the vehicle. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, ^ 12).
10.

In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the vehicle

to a mechanic for inspection and evaluation. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 13).
11.

Through this inspection it was determined that the vehicle had not been kept in

good condition and repair as required by the Agreement. There were many issues, both aesthetic
and mechanical, that required extensive parts and labor to correct. A copy of the estimate of Ken
Martinez dated January 12, 2008 indicates that the Collateral required more than $2,500.00 in
body work. In addition, the engine also needed work as it would not start. (Declaration of Ken
Martinez f f 6-7, Exhibit A).
12.

At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues related

to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive damage to the
vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car saleable, the only
commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the Collateral as salvage. At that
point no offers to purchase had been received and an inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated
that even after the repairs wholesale value was only around $3,500.00 and sales after repossession
generally only bring approximately wholesale value, or slightly less. Attached to the Affidavit of
Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the current wholesale value of the
Collateral. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 14).
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13.

After considering these factors and after receiving no communication from

Defendant, Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer received, which
was for $200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc., selling the vehicle on or about January 23,
2008. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 15).
14.

After the disposition of the Collateral, a letter was sent to Defendant at his record

address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after applying the sale proceeds
to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus collection costs, attorney fees and
interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of January 26, 2008. (Affidavit of Michelle
Rogers, J 16).
15.

Demand for payment has been made and is hereby made upon Defendant for all

sums due and owing pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, but Defendant has failed and refused
to make payment. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, ^ 17).
16.

Jordan has been required to employ counsel in order to enforce the terms of the

Agreement. Pursuant thereto, Defendant is responsible for all collection costs and legal expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Jordan in enforcing the Agreement. (Affidavit
of Michelle Rogers, 1 18).
17.

Defendant Harry Suniville executed the Agreement as set forth in Jordan's First

Cause of Action, and pursuant thereto received the use and benefit of funds.
Michelle Rogers, J 19).

6

(Affidavit of

18.

Defendant has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to him

without compensating Jordan, all to the detriment of Jordan. Defendant currently has the use and
possession of those funds. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 20).
19.

The amount of unjust enrichment received by Defendant through January 26,2008,

under the Agreement is the sum of $8,788.12, together with interest at the highest legal rate from
January 26, 2008, until paid in full. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 21).
20.

Jordan has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to seek

compensation for Jordan for the amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant. Jordan
is entitled to an award of attorney fees. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 22).
ARGUMENT
I. JORDAN CREDIT UNION IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF AGREEMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because there is no material dispute that
Defendant breached the Agreement, that Plaintiff acted in conformity with the Agreement and the
law in repossessing and selling the vehicle, or that Defendant remains obligated on the remaining
loan balance. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be
granted where there is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff in this case is entitled to summary judgment under this
standard.
The material facts in this case are undisputed. Defendant executed the Agreement with
Plaintiff in which he promised to repay to Plaintiff the sum $12,829.00 plus interest in exchange
7

for Plaintiff loaning to Defendant a total of $12,829.00. As security for the loan, Defendant
pledged the Collateral, purchased with the proceeds of loan. By signing the Agreement,
Defendant also made several other promises, including that he would maintain possession of the
Collateral at all times, keep the Collateral at his residence, maintain the vehicle in a condition of
good repair, and to notify Plaintiff of any loss or damage.
The Agreement further provided that any failure on the part of Defendant to fulfill these
obligations would be considered a default of the Agreement, which default then permitted Plaintiff
to exercise any or all of the agreed upon remedies. Those remedies included debt acceleration,
repossession of the Collateral, power of sale to dispose of the Collateral in the event no payment
is received, and to file legal action to collect any deficiency. Defendant also agreed*that he was
responsible for any and all fees related to collection, repossession and disposition of the Collateral.
The Agreement also provided that any notice required regarding the repossession or intended sale
of the Collateral was deemed reasonable if mailed or delivered to the last known address on file
with Plaintiff.
There is no dispute that the Collateral was impounded, dispossessing Defendant of the
Collateral. There is no dispute that the Collateral was damaged and not kept in good repair. In
addition to the extensive body damage, there was an unidentified mechanical issue that prevented
the vehicle from even starting. There can be no dispute, in good faith, that these facts constitute
default under the Agreement.
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Plaintiff had a good faith belief that Defendant would now be unable to meet his obligations
under the Agreement. Because Defendant was in default, Plaintiff exercised its contractual and
legal rights and repossessed the Collateral. Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff provided notice
to Defendant of the repossession and acceleration of the debt, and his right to cure the default by
paying all sums then due and owing. This notice was mailed to the only known address on file
with Plaintiff, incidentally the very address provided by Defendant on the Agreement.
A further default occurred after Plaintiff received no response from the Defendant, much
less the full demanded payment. Defendant's prior pleadings evidence a grave misunderstanding
of the nature of Plaintiff's causes of action. Plaintiff has claimed that Defendant failed to make
the required payment. This claim is based on the fact that the debt was accelerated^by Plaintiff
following default and pursuant to the Agreement. Defendant did not make that payment when due
and Plaintiff then exercised its right to dispose of the collateral and seek the deficiency from the
Defendant. Plaintiff understands now that Defendant was incarcerated at that time. However,
Plaintiff had no knowledge at that time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many
other cases in which debtor's simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their obligations.
Defendant's incarceration was the result of his own choices, and should not be seen as a means
of escaping liability for other obligations.
Defendant has repeatedly inferred that Plaintiff had a duty to use every effort to track him
down, assumably by calling throughout the phonebook and by searching the state's jails. By
making this argument, Defendant fails to acknowledge that the duty to communicate was his. It
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was his duty to care for the vehicle, to prevent its impound, and to understand the Agreement he
signed. While his circumstances may be unfortunate, they are not to be seen as relieving him of
his duties, especially when he made no effort to communicate them to Plaintiff.
Defendant contractually agreed to be obligated on any deficiency, has defaulted on the
Agreement multiple times, was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending
action, and failed to cure the default as provided. Plaintiff recognizes that Defendant was
incarcerated and is not unsympathetic, however, Plaintiff did all it was required or could be
expected to do in this matter. Fairness and justice dictate that Defendant be made to honor his
obligations.
II. THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE.
In repossessing and disposing of the Collateral, Plaintiff was required to ensure the
disposition was commercially reasonable.

Plaintiffs sale of the repossessed vehicle was

commercially reasonable under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (as codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-9a et.seq.). Section 70A-9a-627(2) of the Utah Code Annotated reads as
follows:
. . . (2) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner
if the disposition is made: (a) in the usual manner on any recognized market; (b)
at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or (c)
otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property that was the subject of the disposition.
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). In interpreting this section, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled
that the sale of a repossessed vehicle was commercially reasonable where there was no self dealing
on the part of the dealer/lender, reasonable notice of the sale was given to the debtor, and the
vehicle was sold for a fair price. See Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d
536-542 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
In this case, there was no self-dealing. The vehicle was sold in an arms-length transaction
to an uninterested third party. Notice was provided to Defendant of the repossession and that
unless full payment of the accelerated debt was made by a certain date, the vehicle would be sold.
This notice was provided to Defendant at the only address Plaintiff had been provided and the only
address Plaintiff had knowledge of as a means of communicating with Defendant.
Finally, the vehicle was sold for a fair price under the circumstances. Plaintiff initially
attempted to sell the vehicle in the manner usual and customary among the financial institutions
at public auction. These auctions typically result in a sale of the vehicle at or near the approximate
wholesale value of the vehicle. The current wholesale price of the vehicle is between $3,200 and
$4,400. Plaintiff had the Collateral inspected by an experienced mechanic who determined there
to be at least $2,600.00 in damage, not including engine repairs. It would have been commercially
unreasonable for Plaintiff to expend what was likely to be well in excess of $3,000.00 to make the
Collateral saleable, increasing the total loan debt past $12,000.00 for a vehicle that in perfect
condition would likely not have resulted in a sale for more than $3,500-$4,000. It was\ then
commercially reasonable to sell the Collateral for salvage. The net effect of either avenue was
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essentially the same, a deficiency of between $8,500 and $9,000. The condition of the vehicle
upon repossession was the result of the Defendant alone and he alone bears the responsibility for
the consequences of his actions. Plaintiff made every effort to mitigate its damages and in the end
opted for the less burdensome route.
Regardless of the disposition of the Collateral, Defendant was and remains obligated to
repay to Plaintiff the loan. Defendant's promise to pay was unrelated to his continued possession
of the vehicle. Plaintiff acted responsibly and in accordance with the law and the Agreement and
should be granted judgment on its claims.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no material dispute as to any genuine issue of fact, and as a matter of law
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant, Plaintiff requests that judgment be granted in
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $8,788.12 as of January 26, 2008, plus
interest at the contract rate of 5.5% per annum until paid in full, plus attorney's fees and costs.
DATED this Z f

day of November, 2008.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Douglas A. Oviatt
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on t h e ^ ' day of November, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss to:
Harry F. Suniville
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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EXHIBIT C

FILED Bismm cuum
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 1 2008

Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/534-0909

ySAULAKtCOUNIV

—mAM^mL___

ueputy cie7IT

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

I

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE ROGERS

v.

Civil No. 080903840
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Judge Kate Toomey
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) ss.
)

I, Michelle Rogers, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
1. I am employed by the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), as a
Collection Officer.
2. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts stated
herein.
3. I have personal knowledge of and am familiar with the Complaint on file herein. The
allegations of Jordan Credit Union against the Defendant Harry Suniville are true.

4. On or about October 5, 2005, Defendant executed a Retail Installment Contract and
Security Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference.
5. Jordan Credit Union has performed all of its obligations under the Agreements.
6. On or about December 3, 2007, Jordan received a notice from the Utah State Tax
Commission that the Collateral had been impounded. A true and correct copy of this notice is
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "B".
7. Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement. While the Collateral
remained impounded, storage and impound fees were continuing to accrue and Plaintiff learned
that the vehicle had extensive body damage and would not start. On the good faith belief that he
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan and to mitigate the damage and protect
its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about
December 10,2007.
8. Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation under the
Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be
performed, is considered a default.
9. Defendant consented, by signing the Agreement, that upon default, he was liable to
Plaintiff for all collection costs, including attorney fees, court costs, and fees for towing,
repossession, repair, and storage.
10. Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several remedies
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listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any fees incurred
and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount), repossession and sale of the
collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts left owing after the sale.
11. On or about December 11, 2007, a letter was sent to Defendant at the address he
provided to Jordan stating that the collateral had been repossessed due to the impound action. A
true and correct copy of this letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "C". This letter explained
that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00 and had been added to the loan
balance. The letter further stated that Defendant needed to pay to Jordan on or before December
20,2007 the entire loan balance, $9,312.37 and that failure to do so would result in Jordan selling
the Collateral and that Defendant would be liable for any deficiency between the sale price and the
loan balance.
12. When the deadline passed and Jordan had received no communication from Defendant,
the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, the usual and customary
procedure for the industry. Due to the damage and condition of the vehicle, there was no interest
in purchasing the vehicle.
13. In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the vehicle to
a mechanic for inspection and evaluation.
14. At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues related
to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive damage to the
vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car saleable, the only
commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the Collateral as salvage. At that
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point no offers to purchase had been received and an inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated
that even after the repairs wholesale value was only around $3,500.00 and sales after repossession
generally bring less than book value, or slightly less. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and
correct copy of the current wholesale value of the vehicle.
15. After considering these factors and after receiving no communication from Defendant,
Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer received, which was for
$200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc., selling the vehicle on or about January 23, 2008.
16. After the disposition of the Collateral, a letter was sent to Defendant at his record
address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after applying the sale proceeds
to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus collection costs, attorney fees and
interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of January 26, 2008.
17. Demand for payment has been and is hereby made upon Defendant for all sums due
and owing under the terms of the Agreement. Defendant has failed and refused to make payment.
18. Jordan has been required to employ counsel in order to enforce the terms of the
Agreement. Pursuant thereto, Defendant is responsible for all collection costs and legal expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Jordan in enforcing the Agreement.
19.

Defendant executed the Agreement as set forth in Jordan's First Cause of Action,

and pursuant thereto received the use and benefit of funds.
20.

Defendant has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to him

without compensating Jordan, all to the detriment of Jordan. Defendant currently has the use and
possession of those funds.
4

21.

The amount of unjust enrichment received by Defendant under the Agreement,

through January 26, 2008, is the sum of $8,788.12, together with interest at the highest legal rate
from January 26, 2008, until paid in full.
22.

Jordan has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to seek

compensation for Jordan for the amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant. Jordan
is entitled to an aware of attorney fees.
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

DATED this Yb day of N0\| &lfY\liyy

, 2008.

lichelle Rogers
Michelle
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

(j

)
) ss.
)

Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this
2008, by Michelle Rogers, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she
executed the same.

Notary Public

'iMUL^

C \Documents and Settmgs\Michelle Rogers\Local Settings\Temp\motion for summary judgment wpd

TRACEY JENSEN
MVmmK'STmOFUTAH
9260 SOUTH 3M EAST
SANOY, UTAH 84070
COttM. EXP. 01-15-2012

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on thej^(/* day of November, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Michelle Rogers to:
Harry F. Suniville
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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Exhibit "A

Seller
RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
ANO SECURITY AGREEMENT

No
Date

Buyer

SUXIYILLE HARRT

ACCESS AUTO

2233 DALLIM ST
SALT LWCS CITY, UT B4J49

"Wo" and "us" mean the Seller above its
successors and assigns

ig/«5/«5

"You" and "your" mean each Buyer above and
guarantor jointly and Individually
SALE You agree to purchase from us on a time basis subject to the terms and condrtions of this contract and secunty agreement (Contract) the
Motor Vehicle (Vehicle) and services desenbed below The Vehicle Is sold in its present condition together with the usual accessones and attachments
Description of
Motor Vehicle

Year

VIN
4A3*r$«»3E»17976
Lie No /Year
• NewJ^] Used

2993
MITSUBISHI
ECLIPSE

Description of
Trade In

Other

Yllt

SECURITY To secure your payment and performance undor the terms of this Contract you give us a security interest In the Vehicle all
accessions attachments accessonos and equipment placed in or on the Vehicle together called Properly and proceeds of the Property
You also assign to us and give us a security interest in proceeds and premium refunds of any insurance and service contracts purchased with
his Contract
PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS You promise to pay us the pnncipal amount of $
12B29* W
plus finance
-harges accruing on the unpaid balance at the rate of
5»JJWL_ % per year from today s date until maturity Finance chargess accrue on a
dav
A c t u a l 365
basis After maturity or alter you default and we demand payment wo will earn finance charges on the unpaid
balance at
3 , . 3 * * _ % per year You agree to pay this Contract according to the payment schedule and late charge provisions shown m
he TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES YOJ also agree to pay any additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of this Contract
3 ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGE You agreo to pay an additional finance charge of $
M/A
that will be D paid In cash
~) added to the Cash Price D pa d proportionally with each payment You agree that $
\IX
of the prepa d finance charges
vill be nonrefundable if you pay this Contract In full before the maturity date
DOWN PAYMENT You also agree to pay or apply to the Cash Price on or before today s date any cash rebate and net trade »n value described
n the ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED Q You agree to make deferred payments as part of the cash down payment as reflected in
our Payment Schedule
ANNUAL
PERCENTAGE RATE
The cost of your credit as
a yearly rate,

3.50*

TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES
AMOUNT FINANCED TOTAL OF PAYMENTS
TOTAL SALE PRICE
FINANCE
The amoun! of credit
The amount you will have The total cost of your purchase on
CHARGE
credit,
including your down payment of
provided
to
you
or
on
paid
when
you
have
made
The dollar amount the
all scheduled payments.
your behalf
credit will cost you
$
*/A

% £_

c

21M.52

12829. • •

*

Payment Schedule Your payment schedule will be
Number of Payments
Amount of Payments

226.22

£6

1433*. 52

$

H93E.52

When Payments Are Due

HOKTMLT aSBUUIM 11/19/63

Secunty You are giving a security interest in the Motor Vehicle purchased
££Late Charge 4< a payment is more than
*
days late you will be charged,

.

.

3X of thm <J»lLpqt—«t awount or »3*T>6 d o l l » r « , which fcvT La gr—t*r
Prepayment If you pay off this Contract early you wiH not have to pay a penalty
• If you pay off this Contract early you may be entitled to a refund of part of the Additional Finance Charge
Contract Provisions You can see the terms of this Contract for any additional information about nonpayment default any required
epayment belore the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties
REDfT INSURANCE Credit life credit disability (accident and
Balth) and any other insurance coverage quoted below are not
jquirod to obtain credit and we will not provide them unless you sign
nd agree to pay the additional premium If you want such insurance
e will obtain it for you (if you qualify for coverage) Wo are quoting
alow ONLY the coverages you nave chosen to purchase
redlt Life Insured
D Single Q Joint Prem $_
redit Disability Injured.
D S n g l e DJoint Prem $

~nrr

I/A
, / A

Term.

~trr

our signature below means you want (only) tho insurance coverage(s)
joted above If none are quoted you have declined any coverages we
loroo
uyer

ri/o/b

Buyer

d/cvb

J PROPERTY INSURANCE You must insure the Property securing
iii> Contract You may purchase or provide the insurance through any
sur ince company reason ibly acceptable to us Tl e collision coverage
eductible may not txceed $
•'_*
If you get insurance
um or through us you wilt pay $
"'*
for
l/A
_ of coverayo
tiM> pu miurn s cumulated as follows
M/A
J $ M/i
_ Deductible Collison Coverage S
3$ M *
Deductible Comprehensive Cov $ _
J Fire- Hit ft and Combined Add tiorwl Coverage $ _

•' *

X/A
X/A

1
Slability insurance coverage for bodily Injury and motor
ehlcle damage caused to others is not Included in this
ontract unless checked and Indicated
1 SINGLE INTEREST INSURANCE fou must purchase
ngle interest insurance as pan of this sale transaction You may
urchase tho coverage from a company of your choice reasonably
cetipi ible to us If you buy the coverage from or through us you
ill pu/ $
*'*
for
_ of coverago
J SERVICE CONTRACT With your purchase of the Vehicle
HJ agree to purchase a Seiv co Contract to cover
This Service Contract will be in

ASSIGNMENT This Contract and Secunty Agreement is assigned
the Assign* e phone
Th s assignment it, made f~j under the terms
t a sopir ite agreement I ] under tho turms of It o A^SIGMMCNT
IY SFl LhR o i page I f l This assignment it. m ide with rocoun>o

ITEMIZATION OF AMOMTRNANCETJ
l22S3,
Vehicle Pnce (incl sales tax of $
739.— ) $
~~*7T
Service Contract Paid to
*$
Cash Frlce $
•/A
Manufacturer's Rebate $
Cash Down Payment
$
Deferred Down Payment $
N/A
Total Cash/Rebate Down
M/A
Trade In Allowance $
17JT
Less Amount owmq $
Paid to (includes f)
d Net Trade In (b minus c )
$ _ ~H7I~
e Net Cash/Trade In (a plus d ) $ _ ~i7ir
f Amount to Finance line e (if o is negative)
Oown Payment (e disclose as $0 if negative)
Unpaid Balance of Cash Price
Paid to Puolic Official;. Filing Fees
Insurance Premiums
Additional Finance Charge(s) Paid to Seller
j0
Jkxxmtmtmry P—

~mr

To .
To . Tir» T«*
To
,
To
To
To
Total Other Charges/Amounts Pd to Others
Less Prepaid Finance Charges
Amount Financed
'We may retain or receive a portion of this anwunt

NOTICE TO BUYER
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if
it contains any blank spaces (2) You are entitled to a
completely filled In copy of this agreement (3) Under
the law, you have the right to pay off In advance the
full amount due and under certain conditions to
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON
PAGES 1 AND 2 OF THIS CONTRACT ANO ACKNOWLEDGES
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT
t«/»5/«3
Signature

_

S gnature

•

J

v

l*/«/W
Date

AUUinUNAL I t H M ^ u r i nio ^ u m ii
ocv/UMM T M u n c c m c n i
G E N E R A L T E R M S Y o u have baon g i v e n the opportunity to
a ounts if the proceeds of a sale do not pay all of the amounts
purchase the Vehicle and described services /or the Cash Price or the
you owe us
Total Sale Price The Total Sale Price is the total pnce of the Vehicle
By choosing any one or more of these remedies we do not waive
and any services il you buy them over time You agreed to purchase
our nght to later use another remedy By deciding not to use any
the items over time The Total Sale Pnce shown In the TRUTH IN
remedy we do not give up our nght to consider the event a default if
LENDING DISCLOSURES assumes that all payments will be made as
It happens again
scheduled
The actual amount you will pay may be more or less
You agree that if any notice Is required to be given to you of an
depending on your payment record
intended sale or transfer of the Property notice is r e a s o n a b l e if
We do not intend to charge or collect and you do not agree to
mailed to your last known address as reflected in our records at
pay any finance charge or fee that is more than the m a x i m u m
least 10 days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such
amount permitted lor this sale by state or federal law If you pay a
other period of time as is required by law)
finance c h a r g e or fee that is contrary to this provision we will
You agree that subject to your right to recover such property we
in&iead apply it first to reduce the principal balance and when the
may take possession of personal property left in or on the Property
pnncipat has been paid in lull refund it to you
securing this Contract a n d lakon into possession as provided above
You understand and agree that some payments to third parties as
I N S U R A N C E If required you agree to buy property Insurance on
a part of this Contract may involve money retained by us or paid
the Property protecting against loss and physical damage and subject
back to us as commissions or other remuneration
to a m a x i m u m d e d u c t i b l e a m o u n t i n d i c a t e d in the P R O P E R T Y
If any section or provision of this Contract is not enforceable the
INSURANCE section or as we will otherwise require You will name
other terms will remain part of this Contract
us as loss payee on any such policy In the event of loss or damage to
B A L L O O N P A Y M E N T If any payment is more than twice as large
the Property we may require additional security or assurances of
as the average of all other regularly scheduled payments you may
payment before we allow insurance proceeds to be used to repair or
refinance that p a y m e n t w h e n due You may do so on terms as
replace the Property You agree that if the insurance proceeds do not
favorable as tho terms originally agreed to in this Contract If you
cover the amounts you still owe us you will pay the difference You
muel our normal credit standards This righl does not apply if your
may p u r c h a s e or p r o v i d e the i n s u r a n c e t h r o u g h a n y i n s u r a n c e
payment schedule is adjusted lor seasonal or irregular income or we
company reasonably acceptable to us You will keep the insurance In
do not olfer similar credit at that time
full force and effect until this Contract Is paid in full
P R E P A Y M E N T You may prepay this Contract In full or in part at
If you fail to obtain or maintain this insurance or name us as a
any time Any partial prepayment will not excuse any later scheduled
loss payee we may obtain insurance to protect our Interest »n the
payments until you pay in full
Property
This insurance may Include coveragos not required of you
A refund of any prepaid unearned insurance premiums may be
This insurance may be written by a company other than one you
obtained from us or from the insurance company named in your
would choose It may be written at a rate higher than a rato you could
policy or certificate of insurance
obtain if you p u r c h a s e d the property Insurance r e q u i r e d by this
O W N E R S H I P A N D DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY By giving us a
Contract We will add the premium for this insurance to the amount
security interest in the Property you represent and agree to the following
you o w e us Any a m o u n t we pay will be d u e i m m e d i a t e l y This
A Our 5»erunty interest will not exlend to consumer goods unless
amount will earn finance charges from the date paid at the post
you acquire rights to them within 10 days after we enter into this
maturity rate riesenbed in the PROMISE TO PAY ANO PAYMENT
Contract or they are installed in or affixed to the Vehicle
TERMS section until paid in full
8 You will dofpnd our interests in the Property aqamsl claims made
by anyone else You will do whatever is ntcpss lry lo keep our
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Each person w h o signs this
claim to the Property ahead of the claim ol anyone else
Contr i c t agrees to pay this Contract accordinq to its terms Thu>
(
fhe secunty interest you are giving us in the Property comes,
means the following
ahead of the claim of any other ol your general or secured
A You must pay this Contract even if s o m e o n e else has also
creditors You agree to sign any additional documents or provide
signed it
us with any additional information we may require to keep our
B W e may release any co buyer or guarantor and you will still be
claim to tho Property ahead of tho claim of anyone else You will
obligated to pay this Contract
not do anything to change our interest in the Property
C Wo may release any secunty and you will still be obligated to
0 You will keep the Property in your possession in good condition
pay this Contract
and repair You will use the Property tnr its intended and lawlul
D If we give up any of our rights it will not alfect your duty to pay
purposes Unless otherwise agreed in writing the Property will
this Contract
be located at your address listed on paqe t ol this Contract
E If we extend new credit or renew this Contract it will not affect
E You will not attempt to soil the Property (unless it is properly
your duty to pay this Contract
identified inventory) or otherwise transfer any rights In the
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information is provided lo you separately
Property to anyone else without our prior written consent
W A I V E R To the extent permitted by law, you agree to give up
F You will pay all taxes and assessments on the Properly as they
your rights to r e q u i r e us to d o c e r t a i n t h i n g s
W e are not
become due
required to (1) d e m a n d payment of amount* due, (2) give notice
G You will notify us ol any loss or damage to the Property You will
provide us reasonable access to the Property for the purpose of
that amounts d u e have not been paid, or have not been paid in
inspection Our entry and inspection must be accomplished
the appropriate amount, time or manner, or (3) give notice that
lawfully and without breaching the peace
we intend to make, or are making, this Contract Immediately due
D E F A U L T You will be in default on this Contract if any one of the
following occurs (except as prohibited by law)
THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT
A You fail to perform any obligation that you have undertaken in
By signing below you agree to give us a security interest in the
this Contract
Property described in the S A L E section Y o u a l s o agree to the
B Wo In good faith believe that you cannot or win not pay or
terms of this C o n t r a c t irtcluding the W A I V E R s e c t i o n above
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract
except that you will not be liable for the payments it requires Your
If you default you agree lo pay our costs tor collecting amounts
i n t e r e s t in the P r o p e r t y m a y be u s e d to s a t i s f y tho Buyer s
owing including without limitation court costs attorneys fees and
obligation You agree that we may renew extend change this
foes for r e p o s s e s s i o n repair storage and sale ol the Property
Contract or release any party or property without releasing you
securing this Contract
from this Contract W e m a y take t f ^ s e steps without notice or
II a n e v r n i of default o c c u r s as to any one of you we may
demand upon you
exercise our remedies against any or all of you
You acknowledge receipt of a completed copy of this Contract
R E M E D I E S It you are in default on this Contract we have all of the
remedies provided by law and tins Contract
A We may require you to immediately pay us subject to any
refund required by law the remaining unpaid balance of the
imount fmanc d finance c hiirges and all other ayreed charges
8 We m i / pay f u r " " assessments or other hens or make ropairs
lo ttu Propi rty il you havt not done so W P are not required to
do so Any amount we p iy will be added to the amount you owe
us and will be dm immodiaU ly Th s amount will earn finance
charges from tho date paia if the post ma urity rale described
in tho PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS section until
p iid in lull
C Wo may requm you to m*\kr the Property ivailabio to us at a
placi w< dc stymie th it is i a r o n ably convenient to you and is
D We may unmi diately take po < * ion of me Property by legal
process or sell In Ip bet m doing so WH u u y not breach the
,H 1.1 e or unlawfully t titer onto youi pi onus* s We may th< n sell
thf f r o p t V / mo i p p l / w h i t wt> rerpivo is provided ) \ law to our
reason ioU expc rises »nd tht n toward your obligations
f Except wi { n piohil itod by iw wo may sue you for additional

Signature

Date

NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OP GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE 0EBT0R SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER
IF YOU ARE BUYING A USED VEHICLE THE INFORMATION
YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE
CONTRACT OF SALE

A S S I G N M E N T BY S E L L E R
Sullor soils and «., j r this Retail Inst III»M I t Conirict and r ocunty Aijrfcmom (C unir ict) to the Assignoo Us successors and assigns Including all Its rights
title and interest in this CorWncl and u y guarantee ttecutod MI connection wilh tins Oonlra i Seller gives Assignee fuH power etthof m its own name or in
^Hpr"*- name to lake nil IIHJ.I1 nr o i t w ictions which Seller could havo taken undor this ( ontract (SEPARATE AGREhMCNT II tins Assignment Is made "under
tt c leans of i snparate tyreeawnt *s indicated on paqe t tr* toims or thu asaig MIM nl >io dosci txid in a separate wnlmq(s) ai>d nol as provided below )
Soil* r w m wte
A This Contract represent a j ilu tiy bt-iler lo Buyer on a tune price basis and i ot on a cash b isit,
B l h i tin. i H is ( ontimod n this Contract j r e true and correct
C Tho down payment was nm Jo by the Buyer in tht manner slalod on page 1 ol It is Contr«t and except lor the application ol any m mufacturer s> rebate no
part of tho down r> i>mont was lour ed or paid lo tho Buyer by Stllor or Seller's representatives
D This sale wis completed m accordance with ull applicable, federal and slate law0 i n d regulations
E This Conlr i d ^ v tlid i n d enlorcn iblo n arcordanco w th its terms
F The names and signatures on this Commit are not lorgod tctitious or assumed and are true and correct
G This Contrai t is vested n the Sptlar free ol all lions is not subject to any claims ot dofonscs of the Buyer and tnay bo sold or assigned by tho Seller
H A completely filled in copy of this Contr i d was delivered to the Buyer at the time of execution
I Tho Vehk It has bt en d» liverod to tho Buyer in good condition i n d has been accepted by Buyer
J Alitor h is or will perfect a secunty interest in the Properly in favor of the Assignee
If nny of these * wantias is brearhed or untrue Soller will upon Assignee s demand purch iso this Contracl from Assignee The purchase shall be in cash
in the amount ol the unpaid halanco fincludmq finance charges) plus the costs and expenses ol Assignee including attorneys lees
Seller w II mWmn fy A ^ g i r e Inr my Inss sustained by it beeIUBO of judicial sot o<( or as tho result ol a recovery mads against Assignee as a result of a
claim or delense Buyer h is against Soiler
Seller w iivos nolicn of the aceppt inre ol this Assignment notice ol non payment or non podormanco and notice ol any other remedies available to
Assignei
As*i(jr ue n ay without noliee to Seller and w thout affecting the liability of Seller undor this Assiqnmont compound or release any nghls aqamsl and grant
oxlonsions ol limn for payment to be made to Buyer and any other person obligated under ttus Contract
UNLCSSOIHrHWloFlNOlCArLOONPAGF 1 1 MIS ASSIGNMENT IS WITHOU1 RECOURSE
WI IM Rl COURSr If lhi Assiyn TH nt s mjtft w th NH oiir.n. us ir d e itud on p igc I A ^ qr ee t j k c fhio Ass«j<wrKMit w th certain rights ol recoui .o against
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JORDAN CREDIT UNXOM
PO BOX 1888
SANDY UT 8 4 0 9 1 - 1 8 8 8

NOTICE OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLE
We recently received noUee from the law enforcement agency shown below that a vehicle registered in your name has been impounded. The
information shown fusts iho vehicle, the date it was impounded, and the name of the impound yard where it is stored. If you no longer own thi
vehicle, reply in wilting to the Division of Motor Vehicles, Please provide a copy of the bill of sale with your reply.
Plate: 827UTR VIN: 4A3AC34G83Li017976 Year; 2003 Make: MITSUBISHI
Report//: A1205Q47 Impound Date: 12/03/2007 Impound Reason: DUI
Impound Agency; SALT LAKli COUNTY SHERIFF ~ UT0180000
Impound Yard: GUtLLBRMO BLANCO TOWING 3790 S 150 E SOUTH SALT LAKE UT 84115-4770 (801) 759-2973
To Obtain An Impound Release
S«.»* 1 - Go to your local Motor Vehicle Office and present ownership documents and picture identification; and Pay, if due title and
r!
.ration foes mid $230 Administrative Impound Fee for DUI, tampering of or operation without Ignition Interloek System, or
Exhibition Driving*
Step 2 - Go to the impound yard and present Impound Relea.se issued by the Motor Vehicle ofliee; Pay the towing and storage fees.
Failure To Claim Vehicle listed above within 30 days, may result in die sale of the vehicle at public auction. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-l 103.
Effective May 5, 2003, the registered owner, lien holder, or owner's agent may be entitled to a refund of the DUI fee if the Driver's License
Division did not take action against the driver under Utah Code Ann. §53-3-223 or §41-6-44,10. To obtain a refund of the DUI fee, the persi
must submit a copy of the DDL letter lo die DMV wilhm 30 days of the date of the letter along with T 0 5 4 2 , DUI refund request form.
QU BSTIONS REGARDING THIS IMPOUND NOTICE may be directed to the Division of Motor Vehicles at (801) 297-7780 or
1-800-368-8824 or fax (801) 297-3578, Criminal proceedings related to the impoundment of this vehicle are separate actions and aie not
covered in this notice, nor by the Tax Commission. If you believe the Tax Commission has imposed incorrect fees or penalties, or has erred
regarding the potential sale of this vehicle, you may appeal to die Division of Motor Vehicles as prescribed by Utah Code Ann, §59-1-501 a*
§63-16b-3. However, the Tax Commission has no authority or jurisdiction over the towing and storage fees or the grounds for the
impoundment.
TO APPEAL TAX COMMISSION ACTION
To Qle an appeal with the Tax Commission and TO protect your appeal rights, you must File a "Petition for Redetermination" wilhin 30 days (
Ihe mailing date of this notice, if a petition is not filed within the 30 dny period, the Tax Commission ha* no authority to consider your appc
and this notice becomes ihe final determination. Attach a copy of this notice to your petition and return both to the Utah Slate Tax Commiss
Division of Motor Vehicles, Attn: Special Services/Appeal at 210 N 1950 W, Salt Lake City, UT 84134. The Division of Motor Vehicles \
schedule a telephone-division confidence to answer questions and to discuss the issues widiin 30 days from the date we receive your peutior
After the telephone-division conference, if you still disagree, yourpetilionmay be forwarded to the Appeals Division.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
Division of Motor Vehicles
Special Seivices Ural

" ^ i , i

iMTifcY, Utah K1131

Fax (M)l) V.H M-MM
iv ww. t a*. nt ah«/;/JI •

// you need ttti accommodation under thaAm^nanta with Pliabilities Act, contact ih? Tux Com mi linntti(Sf>])y.97'!mt
uya/oratcfifirtw
»t Ti'Uu-nmmiutu alum Ihtvu * fut Ihe Dt>af(TJ)P) (SQJ) 897-uQ20, Pica * ttUtuo three worhlv?) day*

Exhibit "C

ORDAN
CREDIT UNION Main Office: 9260 South 300 Hast, Sandy UT 84070-2917
(801)567-3351 ore-mail: lonnhclp(<?jordan-cu.ojg,
Dale: 12/11/2007

Re: Account // 58350-3 001

HARRY 1'SUNIVIUJR
2235 S DALLIN ST
SAL r LAKE CITY, UT 84109-1118
Dear HARRY PSUN1VILLE:
On 12/10/2007, Jordan Cjcdii Union repossessed the 2003 MITSUBISHI used as collateral on the above
loan. The repossession expenses incurred to date are $869,00. When added to the outstanding balance
of $8,443.37, the amount owed to the credit union is $9312.37. If you want us to explain to you how we
figured the amount you owe us you may call or write us.
This does not include fees incurred from the repossession company of: $15,00 per day storage, and a
minimum of $25.00 personal property fee. These fees are to be paid to die ^possession company (in the
form of cash) upon delivery of said vehicle.
Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in c«sh or cashier's check by 12/20/2007, the eiedit
union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids. We will then sell the collateral to the highest
appioved bidder. The credit union reserves the right to accept or reject any o\ all bids. You may not bid
on the collateral; however, you may notify othei persons of the sale so that they may present bids, fn lhc
evenl that an acceptable bid is not received, the credit union will sell the collateral in the manner it
deems best. A sale may lake place at any time without further notice to you. If you need moie
information about the sale you may write us or call us.
hollowing the sale of the propeily, the sale proceeds will be applied to the costs of the sale, collection
costs, accrued interest, and then to the outstanding principal If proceeds still remain, the balance will be
delivered to you. If u deficiency remains, the credit union reserves the right to collect from imyonc
obligated to pay* In the event that legal action is taken to recover this deficit, a judgement including
attorney's fees- will be sought. Parties obligated to pay will be responsible for all fees/ charges incurred.
Personal belongings must be claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of Please call if you have
any questions.
Sincerely.
Collections Department
JORDAN ORKDJT UNION
(8(11)507-3351 (S00)866-1655
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Third Judicial Q^tnC,

NOV 2 1 2008

Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/534-0909
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/SALT L A K t u O i m l
>

Dornity (V

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

I

DECLARAI i < >N OF KEN MARTINEZ

v.

Civil No. 080903840
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Judge Kate Toomey
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) ss.
)

I, Ken Martinez, state as follows:
1. I am over the age of eighteen years (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts
set forth below.
2. I am a certified mechanic and have worked in the automotive repair industry for 22
years.
3. I have been asked on several occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair
services on vehicles repossessed by Jordan Credit Union.

4. On or about January 12, 2008,1 was asked by Jordan Credit Union to inspect a
vehicle it had recently repossessed and to provide a repair estimate for the work that would be
required.
5. The vehicle I was asked to inspect was a 2002 or 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse.
6. I inspected the vehicle and found several problems that required work. These
issues included body damage to the entire right side of the vehicle, both front headlight
assemblies, passenger window broken, driver automatic window non-operating, broken tail
light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition the vehicle would not start.
7. I prepared an estimate, as requested, for the body work, parts and labor, required
to repair the vehicle. This estimate was approximately $2,665.00 and did not inclucte any
amount for diagnosis or repair of the obvious engine problem. A true and correct copy of this
estimate is attached to this hereto as Exhibit "A".
8. Jordan Credit Union declined to have the repairs made because the cost was greater
than what the car would sell for at auction.
I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT
THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
EXECUTED on November jLZ—, 2008.

^^~ ^ s s
Ken Martinez
Declarant

-7-

Exhibit A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the ^71 7V day of November, 2008, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Declaration of Ken Martinez to:
Harry F. Suniville
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

I \3\3681\579\CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-Declaration of Ken Martinez.wpd

EXHIBIT E

FILED DISTRICT

muwr

Third Judicial District

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
PROSE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020

JAN . 5 200^

IT LAKE COUN1 i

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

Comes now before this Court, Hctrry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint^
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO

DISMISS AND

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT,
th

(the pleading that I

filed with this Court November 4 , '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed"
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiffs Original Complaint - since this
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received.
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in
Opposition to Defendant's (i Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs
new Memorandum. ..] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that.
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances.
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In

Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25th, I will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2,
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities)
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement" (Their
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only othel"] "Cause
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant
-has had the use, benefit and possession of all the iunds loaned to them [him?] without
compensating Plaintiff.. ." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust
Enrichment," which are the First and Second (and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, andfail, once the
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was.
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg.
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the
Agreement."
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized
statement from my mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims?
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and

argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit
Union.
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their
purchase of a car.
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender;
and how nobody in his right mind would dare to finance a car if these kinds of lender behavior
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm.
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also,

that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiffs actions that their own words describe with this central
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty
and reckless?
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum,
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff. .. in the end opted for the less burdensome route"
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious
"Breach of Contract," by Plaintiffs to be herein considered.
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case.
In plain language, I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points . . . ) they allege it was not, and they
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my car from off the impound lot where it

was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be
seen to contradict themselves:
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points.. . Pg. 5 @ \ 12; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f 14). Remember,
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above
loan."
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points. . . Pg. 3 @ | 4 ; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f7) where they
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded.. . Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or
about December 10, 2007."
2. What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from?
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal selfhelp and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny
by means of discovery.
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,)
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where get all of my body damage repairs made - both
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large
semi-truck, crushing a corner of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and

there it was fixed for 'good as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We
subsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs,
on their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers!
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and
business appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at
least none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other
directories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by
Jordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, "8. Jordan Credit Union declined
to have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at
auction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving,
coming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges?
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computerchip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken?
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter.
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this selfdescribed "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and
accurately price replacement parts?
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that
a right front tire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight,
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic
vehicle equipment violations as these would be?
8. Now turning back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to both front headlight assemblies,
passenger window broken,... broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my

"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, "non-operating," and yet, it is the
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover,
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck
driver will prove this to be so.
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, thenpending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair.
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00,
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place.
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these thenpending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration,
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this cat* including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of
mine, also.

Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less
than the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for
these repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror
Image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once,
besides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage.
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything
fixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint' condition of
maintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me
to compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for
the approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately
adjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of
neighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the
amount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway,
(given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing
coming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage
anyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel.
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of
being unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that
every aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete
all repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts,
involved.
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine
into consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to
Plaintiffs allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to
repossess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to
believe regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as
a justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this
loan collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct
bearing on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral
deficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and
true, actual value.
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What
would it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and
Paint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record
straight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and
friends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively
minor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front
fender,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without
Court extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend
better credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and
significant, disputed material facts?

13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously
too, I am sending the Original and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report,
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot.
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged
by Plaintiff to this car at issue.
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff - now obviously
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40
miles!
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I
believe, and testify that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car,
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points.. . @ Pg. 11) there probably
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough — if not to throw their case out of Court in its
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these
disputed material facts?
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'.
15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum
of Points... places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action."
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.)
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house on December 11 th , (See
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids.

We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder.. . A sale may take place at any
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale
of my car, particularly.
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now
back to the Loan Contract in question (See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property,
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10
days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement!
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided
in this case at issue.
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter.
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard.
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed.
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ *|[7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum,
Pg. 3 @ Tf4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement."
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in
your possession in good condition and repair . .. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the
Property will be located at your address. .." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again."
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, //the situation seems to call for such dire
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept.
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary
and most important obligation - namely, their agreement to make all of their agreed-upon car
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good

condition and repair - or again, they should not be surprised to soon lose their car to repossession
if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender.
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established
standards of normal business lender behavior - not willy-nilly considering him in default at the
slightest deviation from the 'fine print', surely. In other words, provided he has met all of his
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service
mechanic's shop. . . Yet, despite these small 'fine print' deviations from the "in possession"
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in
default" of the car loan contract? And, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender,"then "in
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations,
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal)
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, common sense
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and
temporary storage at the tow yard.
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . ^[4, Michelle Rogers'
s
Affidavit @ \l) "On the good faith belief that he would be unable to make the required
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07."
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f 5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ ^[8,) "on the good
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a
default." .. .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added].

18. It is not very hard to see that this was a very large assumption {presumption, more
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of their
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me:
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever even bothered to send, reported my car's
repossession as a 'done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero
regards for the uncontroverted fact that I had been for them, up until the impound and their
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time,
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest.
19. I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent business decision-making at work when
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum. . . @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff had no
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many other
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time?
20. Plaintiffs weak, feeble, and ineffectual efforts to communicate with me were
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must have by then known where these
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie. my mother's bank (U.S. Bank Private
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had
been in any way communicated to anybody.
With such momentous news as this to communicate, their single Notice of Repossession
letter, dated December 11th - and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified, Return Receipt Requested Mail, or even as a telegram,
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would
have received more and/or different mail than did I.
Moreover, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that I was in Salt Lake County Jail - put there
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest
for DUI. One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far,
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because I, or my family acting in my
behalf, would have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than
was sent to me.

Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) Then, Also: that, "After receiving no
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . @ Pg. 6, f 13,
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ fl5) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an
extended vacation out of town and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far more
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"? . . .
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that
their single letter had actually been received?
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-ofpocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only,
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway.
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with
payments of $226.00 paid to them monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next
proceeded to just flush all of mind and their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting
a single, one time payment of only $200.00?
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty,
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious
and arbitrary. . . One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to
salvage the loan and save my car?
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but was it actually she who was in charge of
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the
worst:
In an earlier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff Jordan Credit
Union has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest
Memorandum. . ., it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc.
on January 23rd, '08. Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.L. County Jail Records, and it

shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3 r arrest that resulted in the
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, '08. My own Verizon cellular phone records
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - 1
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always, from the very
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact.
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to
start."... Incredible!
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, which was not until about 5pm
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ailimportantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08. Now learning that the sale of my
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum..., until January 23rd, then I
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three
days while she made the final arrangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real
and true value!
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sale of a
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumably.)
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23 rd , I think it would be very interesting
indeed to get both these parties in Court, or before a Deposition Hearing? . . .
22. So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or
worse... There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine
sold for a fair price.
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best price Plaintiff could have received for the
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me in it - kept the loan alive, and thereby
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual
Loan Agreement. It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rush to find the "less
burdensome" route. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest
obligation, nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have
been sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still,
if this Court should decide not to rule in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff... and
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be

considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter.
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C)
U
A sale may take place at any time without further notice to you. If you need more information
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, my pg. X, herein,) which required 10, not
9 days notice between December 11th and December 20th; it also seem to fall far short of the
'reasonable notice of the sale5 required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law.
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable"
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to
be, at that time, an adequate collateral sufficiently enough to meet their own security in the
amount loaned to me.
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum... @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of
the vehicle . .. between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-In value
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit 'D' (attached to Michelle Rogers'
Affidavit) which, being a year different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it
was worth in December, 2007.
26. Even still, their own submitted math is wrong, becoming yet one more disputed socalled material "facts" in this case. First, and primarily because, as I have already shown, their
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormously inflated and exaggerated costs of repair,
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as declared by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility,
(to say it kindly.)
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc. . . the math is still wrong insomuch as
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window,
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan customer fails to make
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and
easy, "less burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident
mistakes, no matter how badly they behaved. As such, for egregious and cavalier FAILURE TO
MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES, one might almost regard this resulting collateral deficiency as
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made
"in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and as Article 9 of the

Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As the Utah Court of Appeals has previously ruled, the
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing.)
CONCLUSION
Had I been left in charge of my own car, I'd have sole it for its true worth, retail to a
private buyer, and had money left over after paying off my loan completely, like as not - and this
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would
similarly dictate under these circumstances. Not the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a courtesy that I had every right to expect.
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary
caprices clears the air. Accordingly, I pray for this Court's relief from these bogus and unjust
claims. And, I additionally argue that I should myself be compensated from out of the pockets of
this Plaintiff who, (in their original Complaint, and in their vehement argument against their
previously obtained judgment by default against me, too - a judgment obtained for exactly
double the amount they now are more modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to be? I
hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted by them after they
already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement costs borne
by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, and for^any other
punitive cost relief and damages which this Court feels it appropriate to award me. Thank You
for these considerations.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Memorandum and
Reply In Support of My Preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs
[Original] Complaint, AND as an OPPOSITION RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS,
PREPAID MAIL on the date specified, for Case #080903840.
TO: Richard C. Terry, and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED THIS ^

day alfec&olkf

, 2008.

Harry E/Suniville, Jr., PRO SE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
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A U U I i iurNf\i_ i c n m s u r m i
n
u N t R A L T E R M S > o u have -boon q i \ e n (fie opportunity tu
ich U L the Vehicle Jiid do .cubed SPP/ICCS for tho G J h Puce or IN*
lai ">ilc Purr T) r T o n l Sale Pnrc is 11K tut il price ol thn VBIIICIO
d any seiviv.es if )QU bu> tliem over time ^ o u ugrcod to purrhise
» items over tirno The Total Sufc Price shown In the TRUTH IN
NOING DISCLOSURES assumus that all payments wiH be mode as
heduksd T i n . actual amount y o u will pay may be more or less
pending on your paymont record
We do not intend to charge or collect and you do not agree to
y any finance charge or loo that is more than ttie maximum
icunt permitted for this sale by state 01 federal law H you pay a
ance c h a r g e or fee that is contrary to this provision we will
lead apply it fust to reduce trio principal balance and when the
ncipal has been paid in full refund it to you
You understand and agree thdt some payments to third parties ns
pari of t h r Contract may involve money retained by us or paid
ck lo us HS commissions or othei remuneration
If any soctinn or provision of this Contract is not enforceable the
ler terms will remain part of this Contract

OtV,UHIlT A b H t t M h N I
amounts if the proceeds of a sale do not pay aff of the amounts
you uvve us
Oy choosing uny one o; more of \ho^o rcmodii s we do nol w j i / e
our right lo later use m o hor remedy By deciding not Jo uso any
remedy we do not give up our nght to consider the event a default if
II happens again
You agree ttiat if any notice Is ruqutrod to be given to you of an
intended s i l e or transfer of the Proporty notice is reasonable If
mailed to your last known address as reflected tn our rocords at
least 10 days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such
other period of time as is required by law)
You aqree t h i t sub|ect to your right to recover such property we
may take possession of personal property left in or on the Property
socunng tfiio Contract and takon into possession as provided above
I N S U R A N C E If required you agroo to buy property Insurance on
the Property protecting against loss and physical damage and subject
to a m a x i m u m d e d u c t i b l e amount indicated i n the P R O P E R T Y
INSURANCE section or as we will otherwise roqutro You will name
us as loss payee on any such policy In the event of loss or damage to
\ L L O O N P A Y M E N T If any payment is more than twice as large
the Proporty we may require additional secunty or assurances o l
the average of all other regul.irly schodulcd payments you may
payment before wc allow insurance proceeds to be used to repair or
irmncn t h i t payment w h e n d u e Y o u may do so o n terms as
rorable as the terms ongmally agreed to en this Contract ff you replace Ihe Property You agroe that tf tho insurance proceeds do noi
cover the amounts you still owe us you will pay the difference You
•et our normal credit standards This right does not apply if your
may p u r c h a s e or provide t h e Insurance t h r o u g h any insurance
yment scln dule is adjusted for s e a s o m l or irregular income or we
company reasonably accHptablo to us You will keop Iho insurance In
no! offer similar credit at that limp
full lorce and eltect until this Contruct Is paid in full
R E P A Y M E N T You may prepay flits Contract In lull or in part at
If you tall to obtain or maintain this insurance or name us as a
y time Any p irtial prepayment will not excuse any Idtar scheduled
loss payee we may obtain insurance to prolect our Interest in the
yments until you p ly in lull
A n fund uf nny prep »»<1 unearned msuumra prorrMums may be Property This i n s u n n c e mav include coveragos not required ot you
This in urancc may bo written by a company other than ono you
tamed Itom us or from th<» insurance company named in youi
would choose It may be written al a rate higher Uian a rato you could
lic> or c e i t i t i c i t t of insuiance
rfVNERSHIP A N D DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY Oy giving us a obtain if y >u purchased the property insuranco required by this
Contract We will add the premium tor this insuranco to tho amount
nurity hteiBst in the Property you reprrsnnl and agree to the lollowmg
you o w e us Any amount w c pay will be due immediately This
A Our spr unty interest wilj nol extend lo consumer goods unless
arnounl will earn tinancu charges from Ihe date paid at the post
you acquire rights to thorn within 10 d lys after we onler into this
maturity rale d i „c nbr ri in the PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT
Cnptr ict or the v are mot jlled <r CM dllmed «o the Vchitti.
B You will UHtiRiOur i n l e r c L in mc Property aqainsl ciiims nwdr
*"EMMb s«n. »or unl I p<i d in Jul'
by "anyone BISP YOU will du whatever u t eei ss in, to keep uui
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T E a r n person w h o signs this
claim lo tho Property IJIQ-KJ of the claim of anyonp pise
Contr ict agrees tn pay this Contract according to its terms This
C l"he secunty inlc rnsi you ara qiving us in the P openy comes
ncdns the lollowinq
ahead of the claim ol any other ol your o c n o n l or secured
A You musl pay this Contract even if someone else has also
ci editors N ou agree lo sign nny additioml docurnerts or provide
siui ed i
us with i n v additional information we rna/ require to keen) our
B W c may release any co buyer or guarantor and you will still be
claim lo Iho Properly attend of tho claim of anyone c'se You will
obligated to pay this Contract
not do anything to chango our Interest in the Property
C Wo may rolease Hny secunty and you will still be obligated to
D You will keep the Property in your possussion in good condition
p ly thit, Conlraci
and repair You will use the Property for its intended and lawful
D II we give up any of our rights it will not aflecl your duty to pay
purposts Unless othwwtse agreed in writing the Property will
be located al your address listed on paqs I ol this Contract
this Contract
E You will not attempt lo sell the Properly (unless tt is properly
E It we extend new credit or renew this Contract H wiH not affect
tdontifiod inventory) or otherwise transfer any rights in tho
your duty to pay this Contract
Property to anyone else without our prior vuitten consent
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information Is provided to you separately
F You will pay all taxes and assessments on the Properly as they W A I V E R To the extent permitted by law, y o u agroe t o glvB u p
become due
your rights to require u i to do certain things
We are n o l
G You will notify us ol uny loss or damage to the Property You will required t o (1) demand payment of amounts duo (2) give notice
provide us reasonable access to tho Property lor the purpose ol
that amounts due have not been p»ld, or have n o t boon paid i n
inspection Our entry u n d inspection must be accomplished
the appropriate a m o u n t , t i m e or manner or (3) glvo notice that
lawfully and without breaching the peace
we intend to make o r are m a k i n g , this Contract Immediately due
E F A U L T You will be in default on this Contract if any one of the
(lowing occurs (excepl us prohibited by law)
A You fail to perform any obligation that you have undertaken in
THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT
By signing bolow you agroe to give us a secunty Interest tn the
this Contract
Property described In the SALE section You also agree to the
B Wo In good f i l t h believe that you cannot or will not pay or
terms of this Contract including the W A I V E R section above
perform the obligations you have agreed to In this Conlract
except that you will not be liable lor the payments it requires Your
If you default you agree to pay our costs for collecting amounts
interest in the P r o p e r t y m a y be u s e d to satisfy the B u y e r s
ving including without limitation court costs attorneys foes and
obligation You agree that * e may renew extend change this
cs for r e p o s s e s s i o n repair storage a n d sale of Ihe Property
Conlraci or release any party or property without releasing you
curing this Contract
Irom this Contract W e m a y lake t r a s e steps without notice or
If an cvr nl of default o c c u r s as to any one of y o u we m a y
dcrnond
upon you
e r r h e our remedies aqain-st any or all of you
E M E D I E S II you are in dolault on this Contract we have all of the
You acknowledge receipt of a completed copy o( this Contract
medics provided by law and this Contract
A We may require you to immediately pay us subject to any
rclund required by law the remaining unpaid balance of the
imount financed finance ehurges and all othor agreed charges
B We rrny p ly t'ues assessments or othor liens or make ropairs
lo thn Property il you have nol done so W e are not required to
do so Anv amount we pay will be added to the amount you owe
us ana will be due immodiately This amount wilt earn finance
charges from th< date paid al the post maturity rale described
in the PHOMISF TO PAY AMD PAYMENT TERMS section until
p tKl in full
C Wo may requirr you to ma,kr Ihe Property available to us at a
t»laef* w< d< oiynale II"* if is redsonably convenient to >ou a no us
D / u
w> t«r <ri !-•« r ) o*r in *• r .. nn o - F* r r*, y
^ I
process or sell help IJLI in doing so we may no b r e a d Ihe
peace or unlawfully niter onto /Ou« piomtses Wc a n y then sell
Ihe Property i n d ippl\ \ l n t wr mreivM as pruvuled j> law lo out
(i ason jok cxprtn*PS and Itien toward your obligations
f Except w f i n i prohibited t»y l i w we ma> sue you foi irltlittoml

nt-

Dale

Signature

NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
OEBTOR HEREUNDER
ic VQIJ - o r

0,jv N

r

A

IJsE0 "EHir 1 E THE IM r ORMWRN

YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE
CONTRACT OF SALE

ASSIGNMENT BY SELLER
lloi iclls MK.1 u j t j i c Ibis Hel ui IMM illMiont Conir-»rl »nd r«K-entY Ag»H>nHjru (Cimu irt) lo rtio A sit/nwi its succossors and assigns Including all lis rights
fl and rnturi M m this Conlncl and any yuniuntoe e-d'culed in COIVIBCIICM with ltd TontJuU S>tH«f gives A^MgrKje lull power oithci in Hs own nun>i or in
H«r c iiaiiy. to i iWo ««U lixpl or other actum-- which SuHw could havo t «ken undor Ihls Conlraci (SrPARATE AGREEMCNT II tins As3"jrwncnt Is mwJe "undi r
e terms ol i spf di »le uyret rn»itl" H* moV rtlud on paye 1 tt»c lurtiu ol thu T^igroi* nt u.o dos« nbed n T s o p i n l o wnling(&) a * t not as provided botow )
^(ilh ( wtirrdn(<;
Thij ConiMCt re pre^t-nlb ,i 5 ilo liy t Her lo Buyer on a Hint prtet IMJI and nol on i cash b isis
1 he 1 iiumi nis runt nntttt in this Coniricl ar» true and correct
Tho down payniHitf wns made by the Buyer in the manner stated ot\ p j y * ] ol »w Conir * 1 dnti ein,opl for Vm ,»ppJ»caiKX» of any fTMinulnclurer t, lebaie no
pnrt nl tho tViwn p ^ n i r n i w i lo im«d or piid 10 tho buyer by Gcllor or Suitor's rooroj.ontativos
Itus s ilo wns compteted m iceordanro witti all applicable ledural and state law«, nut reyulalion^
This Cfinlr it t is, valid and Lntortr* ibte in lucoidnnco witti its lorms
The names and siu/uturp* on this Conlioct are not forgod llclltioui 01 uj^wne'd and ire true and correct
this Conirwct lo vu-tod in tho Si Her Iroo of all lions is not subjftct to any claims or dofonses of the Buyor and may bo sokl or assigned by the Seller
A completely filled in copy of this Contr ict was delivered to the Buyer ot the lime ot onocution
f hi Vehu le tin" been d« liverod to the Buy« r m good condition and has been accepted b) Buyer
'rtifoir ft is or will pertri I a socunty interest in tho Properly In favor of the Assignee
H nny ol U«e^ w irranho- is breai-hcd or untiuc So««w will upon Assiqnnn s drmand purchnso Ihis Conlraci from Assignee The purchabe shall be in cash
the amount ol the unpaid haHnee fmrkidmq finance charges) plus trie costs and oxpensc.* ot Assignee including attorney"; lees
Siller wll mlemniy A b j u r e Inr anV tnis sustained by it becauce of (udicial set ott or os the rosull of a rookery made aqainst Assiqneo as a result Of a
Jim or delense Buyer h r ag mist Gollcr
SeJkji wwtvc rtotle*1 nl thertcen|ilnn«e of iriis As.vqnm«nt notice ot non piymont or non poriormanco and notice d any other romodios available to
4«»ir)ntH.
A. JJIHM may wtttiout iwiliec to SeHr r riiirl wiihoul affnetmy UIH Iwbility of SeilLi undor ihib A«-biqnniont compound or roloise any rights ayainst and grant
lonslrHK ol ilmn for piyinnni to bo mide to 6uy«.r and an> othor porson obligated undei Itiis Conlcatt
4LCr,S OT| t r i IVVI iF INIJtC Al LD Ot^ PACE 1 P US ASSIGNMEM1 lb WtTHr)Ul FtbCOUHSE
m i HI COunSr If »ti A bigmncnl r mnJe * tr a c o « c' H IMJIL ltud on p itjt. t A ^ i y i ue Utko thi„ Aj,s»ynn»oni with cernm ughts ot lecouise afpmst
^'L boliri ig LG lial it Ui Buyfi «l« I T I I K on <ny nbliqiiion of p^ymonl or podnfrmxo undrtr tluu Conlnrt Sailor w l ! uptm demand rnpurt h ISH tt«s

belter
DETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
ANO SECURITY AGREEMENT .

Buyer

ACCESS AUTO

SUIIYILLE HARRT

jt

2 2 3 3 DALLIK ST
SALT UKX CITT. ITT M 1 W
"You" and "your" mean each Buyer above and
guarantor Jointly and Individually

"We" and ue mean the Seller above its
successors and assigns

l«/«3/03

L E . You nqree to pure/use from us on a time basis subject to tho torms nnd condition:, of this contr i d and socuriry agreement (Contract) the
tor Vehicle (Vehicle) and sorvnes described below The Vehicle is sold in it, prcbonl condition togather with the USU3I accossonos and atlachments
scriptlon ol

Year

tor Vehicle

Make

chased

Model ,

4A3A«34G*3£917?76

29«3

Lie No-'Year

H I T S U 8 I S H I

CCLIPBI:

scnption of
dc In

Yim

C U R I T Y To secure your payment and pcrtormance under the terms of this Contract you give us a security interest in the Vehicle all
QSoions attachments accessories and equipment placed in or on the Vehicle together called Properly and proceeds ol the Property
J albo assign to us and gn.e ui. a security interest m prooouds and premium refunds ol any insurance and service contracts purchased with
Contract
OMISE T O PAY A N O P A Y M E N T T E R M S

You promise to pay us the principal amount o l $

iges accruing on the unpaid balance at the rate of

3_3*«

12522*^$

plus linanee

% per year Irum today s date until matunty Finance charges accrue o n a

. day basis After rmtunty or alter vou default and we dennmd payment wo will oarn finance charges on UKJ unpaid
inco at

3 _ 5 & l _ ' » per year You ayroe to pay this Contract according to the payment «-.chodulfl and late eharyu provisions shown m

TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES You i l s o agree to pay m y additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of this Contract
ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGE
added o Ihp Cash Price

You agruo to pav an additional finance charge ol $

JL/JL

D paid piuportionally with each payment You agree thai $

»_ that will bo D paid in cash

I/A

ol trie prepaid finance charges

on norm fjndaOle if ^ou puy this Contr ict in lufl before the maturity date
W N P A Y M E N T You also agroc to pay or apply tu ttie Cash Price on or boloro todays dale any cash rebate and net trade in value described
I P ITEMIZATION OF A M O U N T FINANCED D You agree to make deferred payments as p a i l ol the cash down payment as reflected in
r Payrnont Schedule
T R U T H IN L E N D I N G D I S C L O S U R E S
RNA^CE
CHARGE
Trie dollar amount the
credit wilt cost you

ANNUAL
ERCENTAGE RATE
i c cost ol your credit as
a yearly rate
3,30*

j

21«1 52

%

tyment Schedule

TOTAL o A c E PRICC
T C T \ L O F P/^MCNTS
The amount you will have Tho total cost of your putchas« on
paid when you have made credit, induing your down payment of
all schaduled payments.
S
*^A
c
14S3«. 32

A»'CU*TPNAjlCED
The amount ol credit
provided to you or on
your behalf

12fl29 » •

:—r«jans2

Your payment schedule will be

jmber ol Payments

Amount ol Payments

When Payments Are Due

BOmiLT K a i M I B G 1 1 / 1 9 / W

226.22

C£

c u r i t y You are giving a socunty interest in tlxi Motor Vehicle purchased
Late Chargo II a payment is more than
*
_ days late you will be charged

3 1 o f t l w d*lliMitt»*t a » o u n t o r * 3 * . *J d a i i « r w f
spayment

wktnh # v « r 1 * g r w r t a x

If you pay off this Contract early you will not havo to pay a penalty

Q 11) on pay oil this Contract early you may be entitled to a refund of part of the Additional Finance Charge
H i r e d P r o v i s i o n s You can see the terms of this Contract for any additional information about nonpayment default any required
ayment before the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties
EDIT I N S U R A N C E Credit life credit disability (accident and
th) and any other Insurance covorage quoted bplow are not
nrod to obtain credit and we will not provide them unless you sign
agree to pay the additional premium If you want such Insurance
vlll obtain it lor you (if you qualify for coverage) Wo are quoting
w ONLY tho coverages you nave chosen to purchase
dlt Life Insurod
Single Q Joint
j i t Disability

~WA~

Prem $ _

Insured

Single Q Joint

ITEMIZATION OF A M O U N T F I N A N C
12239.W
739. M
) S

Vehicle Pnce (mcl sales tax of 5
Service Contract Paid to
Manufacturer's Rebato

$

Cash Down Payment

S

Deferred Oown Payment $
Trade In Alluwance

S

Less Amount owmq S

wrr

X/A

H/A

rrr

Paid to (includes I )
d

Net Trade In (b mmus c )

$_

e Net Cash/Trade In (a plus d ) $ _
Amount io Finance line e (if e is negative)

signalurr below rneuns you want (only) the insurance covenge(s)
<»d abo e If none aro quoted you have doclined any coverages we
oo

f

=»r

Paid to Public Officials

D o w n Payment (e

~X/A~

~trr

disclose as $0 if negative)

U n p a i d Balance of Cash Price
3

d/o/b

Buyer

d/o.'b

R 0 P E R T Y I N S U R A N C E You must insure the Property sccunng

Contract You rrwiy purchawi or provide the insurance through any

Filing Fees

ranee company o i s o n ibty accept iblu to us Tin. collision coverage
jet bl*» mav n >i exceed S

Tc

oi through us you will pay S

tl you oet msuranco

*^*

To .

for

*/A

_ of coverage

T i r * T«oc

Deductible Collision Covorago S

H/A

To

M/A

Deductible Comprehensive Cov $

•'^

To .

*'*

Total O t h e r C h o r g e a / A m o u n t s Pd to Othara

s

M/A

alllty i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e for b o d t l y Injury a n d m o t o r
i c l e d u m a g e c a u s o d t o o t h e r s is n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h i s
ltract unless c h e c k e d and indicated
SINGLE INTEREST INSURANCE

f o u must purchase

Je Interest insurance as part of this sale transaction

/ o u may

base the covorago from a company of your cholco reasonably
ipt ible to us II you buy the coverage Irorn or through us you
. lor.

P<«y $ .

of coverago
SERVICE C O N T R A C T

With your purchase of the Vehicle

agio* to purchase a Service Contract to covor
This Service Contract wilt be in

SIGNMENT

Lass P r e p a i d Finance C h a r g e *
A m o u n t Financed

NOTICE TO BUYER
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if
it contains any biank spaces (2) You are entitled to a
completely flllcd-ln copy of this agreement (3) Under
the law, you have the right to pay off tn advance the
full amount due and under certain conditions to
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON
PAGES 1 AND Z OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGES
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT
t«/»5/©3

Thts Contract and Security Agreement is assigned
the Assignee phone
[~] undor tho lorms ol the ASblGNfv'CNT

SEt L b H on page «, (~I This issignmoni i t made with rocourso

^

J

^

~

Date

ie/e3/03

This issignment is. mado D under the lermt.
agreement

tn
~I2A2^7»«"

*We may retain or receive a portion of this a m o u n t

Signature]

sop >r i l l

2997f*~
K7A
15370* "

. .M/A
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Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/534-0909
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

I

REPLY AND OBJECTION

v.
Civil No. 080903840
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Judge Kate Toomey
Defendant.

Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby submits its reply to
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff also objects to
the Response and objects to this Court's consideration of Defendant's response and all exhibits
and other offers of evidence. This objection is made due to Defendant's violation of Rules 7,
10, and 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and because the proposed evidence is
inadmissible on the grounds of hearsay and lack of proper foundation.
I. GENERAL OBJECTION
Plaintiff objects to any consideration of Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment. This objection is based on the following: the lack of signature, improper
form and memorandum exceeding the allowed pages, in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
7 and 10, and 11, and lack of foundation, and is supported by the filings and pleadings of record
and the argument set forth below.
Defendant has already been put on notice by this Court of his obligation to abide by the
Rules of Civil Procedure, that his choice to proceed unrepresented by counsel would not relieve
him of this duty nor allow him special consideration or treatment. Defendant has yet to present
one piece of admissible evidence in support of his many pages of argument. This most recent
memorandum is the equivalent of twenty-eight double spaced pages, where the rule mandated
maximum is five. It is impossible for Plaintiff to fairly and adequately respond to Defendant's
many points and still stay in compliance with the applicable rules. A proper remedy is to exclude
the memorandum and offered documents from consideration.
Therefore, Plaintiff requests that Defendant's response be stricken in its entirety, or in the
alternative, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court limit its consideration to the first two and
a half pages of argument, the equivalent of the five page maximum allowed by rule.
Plaintiff also objects to admission of any and all exhibits submitted by Defendant as well
as the numerous unsupported facts alleged throughout his memoranda. Defendant has provided
only one notarized statement, which was neither sworn nor given under penalty of law, the
substance of which is not even material to the argument before this Court, i.e., the timeliness of
previous loan payments. Plaintiff's action is based on Defendant's failure to pay the rightfully
accelerated debt when called due. The prior payments are irrelevant and immaterial.

Because Defendant has provided no foundation for any exhibit or purported fact, Plaintiff
requests that this Court strike and not consider all Defendant's exhibits and any purported facts
set forth in his memoranda, with the clear exception of references to Plaintiffs evidence.
II. REPLY
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN THIS CASE BECAUSE DEFENDANT
HAS PRESENTED NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
Defendant has failed to provide facts which present a genuine issue of material fact in this
case Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The facts, as presented by Plaintiff in its initial memorandum, remain undisputed.
Defendant executed the contract containing a security interest in the vehicle. Defendant breached
that contract by failing, by his own admission, to maintain the vehicle in good working order and
in his possession. Jordan was within its rights under the contract and applicable law, to repossess
the vehicle after impound and to accelerate the debt. Defendant was given proper notice under
the terms of the contract of the repossession and possible sale of his vehicle. That notice was only
required to be sent to the address he provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs evidence indicates that the
vehicle was properly sold on January 17, 2008. (Second Aff d of Michelle Rogers). Defendant
was subsequently notified of that sale and the deficiency, for which he is liable under the contract.
Notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, Defendant has not provided any
admissible evidence to place any of these facts in dispute. Instead, Defendant asks this Court if
the actions of Plaintiff were prudent or reasonable business practices. This argument is irrelevant
and immaterial to the case at hand. The prudence of Plaintiff s actions is not at issue in this case,

only whether such actions were permitted under existing and accepted principles of law. The
answer to that inquiry must be yes. Plaintiff had a valid contract, which was breached by
Defendant, entitling Plaintiff to exercise its rights for enforcing the contract. The actions
precipitating the response by Plaintiff were of the Defendant's own making and choosing.
Because there is no genuine issue of fact in dispute, Plaintiffs motion should be granted and
judgment entered against Defendant.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has established, by the evidence, that there was a contract between Plaintiff and
Defendant, that Defendant materially breached that contract, that his breach was not excused, and
that Plaintiff was then entitled to enforce the default provisions within that contract. Defendant
has not provided this court with argument or admissible evidence to place any material part of
Plaintiffs claim in dispute. Summary judgment is proper in this case and Plaintiff respectfully
requests that this Court grant Plaintiffs motion and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
DATED this ^ £ day of December, 2008.
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

By

nx?7V
Douglas A. Oviatt
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Reply and Objection to:
Harry F. Suniville
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

EXHIBIT G

Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/534-0909
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

I

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE
ROGERS

v.
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,

Civil No. 080903840

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

|

Judge Kate Toomey

)
) ss.
)

I, Michelle Rogers, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
1. I am employed by the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), as a
Collection Officer.
2. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts stated
herein.
3. I have personal knowledge of and am familiar with the Complaint on file herein.
The allegations of Jordan Credit Union against the Defendant Harry Suniville are true.

about the 23rd of January, 2008. This was the date noted in the deficiency letter sent to Mr.
Suniville, however this was actually the date the sale proceeds were applied to the loan. A copy
of that transaction history is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This record was made
contemporaneous with the transaction, and is a record regularly kept in the course of business
5. The sale of the vehicle did in fact occur on January 17, 2008. Attached hereto as
Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the check from the buyer, dated January 17, 2008.
6. The delay between the actual sale and the posting of the proceeds was for
administrative and processing purposes.
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT

DATED this _1>L day of ]MMML

, 2008.

Michelle Rogers
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this /^^day of
Uec^^bc^
2008, by Michelle Rogers, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
she executed the same.

L

?5?«--

[ \3\3681\579\D.wpd

Notety Public

XS%v
. ^ ' '''-V^A

X^ A*
v

JASON SPENCER
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH

926 S 300 E

°

\T$/x}
SANDY UT 84070
^"iTL^,>
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 08-25-2009

Exhibit A

Account Histories
1 HARRY F SUNIVILLE
1418 SO 1100 EAST #5
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84105(2427

Account: 58350-3

SSH: XXX-XX-3848 j

Telephone: (801) 598-0522

Branch: Sandy

I

Association:

From: 01/01/2008 to 02/01/2008

|

Share History
Description

001-Regular
I Shares

Br

Effective
01/01/2008

1

01/23/2008

1

01/23/2008
01/23/2008

Transaction
Description
Previous
Balance
SHARE
DEPOSIT
GNRL/LDGR
ADJ
REPO
SALVAGE
PROCEEDS

Amount

Withheld

Balance

0.00

0.00

25.35

200.00

0.00

225.35

Code

SD

Teller
Id

Number

i
416226 I

B9

i

-200 00

0.00

25.35

GL

416232

B9

MG

416232 j

j
B9

Loan Histor/
| Description

Effective

001-REPO

01/01/2008

Br

01/14/2008
01/23/2008

1

01/23/2008
01/25/2008

1

01/25/2008

1

01/25/2008

Copyright©2001, SOSystems, Inc

1

Transaction
Description
Previous
Balance
Repossession
Rep
GNRL/LDGR
ADJ
REPO
SALVAGE
PROCEEDS
LOAN
PAYMENT
Lobby
Transaction
(LP)
Next Loan
Payment
Due: 01 Mar
2008

Amount

Principal

Interest

0.00

0.00

0.00

Balance

Fees

Code

Hun

0.00 i 9,104.09
i

GL

25C

0.00 j 8,959.09

GL

416

0.00

0.00 ; 8,959.09

MG

416

-182 29

-43 93

0.00 I 8,776.80

LP

46^

0.00

0.00

0.00

8,776.80

NS

46^

0.00 , 8,776.80

NS

46^

55.00

55.00

0.00

0.00 j 9,159.09

-200 00

-200 00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-226 22
0.00

i

!
i

0.00

0.00

0.00

Exhibit B
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DOLLARS

WELLS FARGO BANK
KORTMWSSTfi'A
£9SS3U?h .Man Street, 7lh Fbcr
Sa't Lake Cljy. Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the

day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Michelle Rogers to:
Harry F. Suniville
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

EXHIBIT H

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LA
DlSTtU
Haiiy F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent

M^JUTAH

2U AM 9* 3 1
AFFIDAVIT OF RON UINCraU&Yici
f

THIRD J « P l C j f t ^ T T
SM.T

vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

Case #080903840
Judge Kate A- Toomey

My name is Ron Hinckley and I am Harry F. Suniville, Jr's. (#17265) assigned prison
caseworker while he remains housed at Utah State Prison, Promontory facility. Draper site. The
attached copy is taken from Harry's "blue packet" and I can confirm and verify that this is a tme
and accurate, correct copy of information recently considered by the Utah State Board of
Pardons at Mr, Suniville's Board Hearing.
Information like this is culled from a variety of official sources such as police reports,
and Adult Probation and Parole investigative reports. This specific and attached page is copied
from a Post-Sentencing Report prepared for the Board of Pardons b\ the Utah State Department
of Corrections * Adult Probation and Parole, relative to a traffic stop by the Salt Lake County
•Sheriffs Office on 12/03/07, which resulted in his subsequent arrest for alleged DUI/Drugs.
Based on the attached document, I would feel comfortable to say that yes, his car was obviously
running up until the time of its impoundment on this date - which is a disputed fact at issue, as I
understand it, in the case cited above.
However, to be clear, I cannot personally speak to anything of that: rather, I can onl>
personally attest that the page attached (Please see Exhibit A, attached) is a legitimate and
accurate partial copy of an Investigative Post-Sentence Report prepaied b} a certified
officer/agent of the Department of Corrections' Adult Probation and Parole office.
I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT
THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
EXECUTED ON

2009.

Ron Hincklcv
STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT I AKF ) w

Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this
, 2009, by
[
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires

VTA

, &*%.

*

%*&'

Notary Seal

dav of
signer of the

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (AFFIDAVIT OF RON
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date
specified, for Case #080903840.
HINCKLEY)

TO:

DATED THIS

^C^

Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111

davof

•&&*

, 2009.

lacfy F univille, Jr., PRO SE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
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Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
PROSE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE CFIiEg BlSTBttifr COUBT
I hird Judicial District

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

NOTICE TO COURT,
AND TO PLAINTIFF,
REGARDING NEW EYi

FEB 2 h 2009
ALT u\|<E COUNTf
eputy Clerk

Case #080^03840
Judge Kate A, Toomey

.

.

i i-^
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MIRROR IMAGE
AUTO/BODY & PAINT

Estimate
1

608 W. CENTER STREET
MIDVALE, UT 84047
J

Date

Estimate #

lfi&M2&g*

48

Phone #
801-748-4993

I HARRY SUNNYVILLE
2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE

1

Description

Rate

Qty

j REPLACE RH FENDER
[LABOR

j REPAINT RH FENDER
PAINT & SUPPLIES

;

—

Total
175.00
40.00
44.00
44.00

1
3
3

175.00T
40.00T
132.00T]
132.00T

-

| Subtotal

Sales Tax (6.85%)

Total

$479.00 j
$3281

Motor Vehicles could confirm and verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this part of our statement,
regarding these October \ehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing
certifications.
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SA1TH NAUGHT.
EXECUTED ON

Feb.

fo

,2009.

BY

BY:

Mirror Image Auto Bod\ and Paint
608 W. Center Street
Mid\ale.UT 84047

ST A.TE OF T TT AH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
__ Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this
day of
Kb.
. 2009, by
g W i n t h w^rCiX&
•
•
. signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me
that he/she executed the same.
fO

My Commission Expires

< >

p - >% - gQ<s°|

Notary Seal

Officer Barrett booked the defendant into the Salt Lake Adult Detention Center for Possession of
Cocaine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, DUI third offense, Driving on an Alcohol Revoked
License, and Driving Without an Interlocking Device as well as other outstanding warrants.

Exhibit "A
RESTITUTION:
There is no restitution determined in this case.

CUSTODY STATUS:
Judge Atherton from the Salt Lake Third District Court sentenced Mr. Suniville to the Utah State
Prison on October 10, 2008, for a term of 0-5 years for case #071909070. Mr. Suniville is
currently serving this sentence.
CRIMINAL HISTORY UPDATE:
(Update any arrest/convictions since the last Pre/Post Sentence Report).
DATE
/10/2008

ARRESTING AGENCY
Salt Lake County Sheriff

720/2008

Adult Probation and Parole

OFFENSE
WA- Theft, Felony
WA- Possession of a Controlled Substance, Felony
WA- DUI, Felony
BW- Possession of Drug Paraphernalia

DISPOSITION
No Disposition ,
Justice Court Warrant
2

Inmate Number

L r r*

us

s

&S1EMS?J7 jfiQ^SSa
g

Inmate Housing^.
Utah State Prison
PO Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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EXHIBIT J

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKfcfiQ&ftJTOfl^
09 FEB 2 5 M 9- U 2
AFFIDAVIT / D E C L A R A T O R yisTRiCT
FROM MIRROR i l | K | j L W ^ N T Y
BODY AND PAINT

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/'Respondent

VS.

BY-^g^yvT^LERK

Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Dick and Shannon

U^lfi

/ Ok

, do solemnly state as follows:

1. I am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts
set forth below.
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for

number of years). My main areas

of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting.
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047.
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr.. because on several occasions
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body repairs, plus
painting sendees, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him,
starting with autumn, 2003.
5- On or about October 9th, 2007, we were asked by Hairy F. Suniville, Jr., to inspect his
cayenne red 2003 model year Mitsubishi Eclipse, and to provide a repair estimate for the work
that would be required to fix a dent on this car's passenger-side front fender. I believe he might
have explained at that time that this newer dent on his car had been caused by a drunken
apartment-complex neighbor.
6- At the time of this estimation for new repair services required, there were then
pending between us, by previous verbal contract and understanding, some as-yet-unmadc repairs
to this same car's front bumper panel. At that time, Harry had credit at our shop sufficient

enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which
would be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched.
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.81, (body work parts and labor,)
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint
perspective,) "good as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this
hereto as Exhibit A.
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.00 part,) because Harryhad already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of tlie broken
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo - that all the other extrinsic and attached parts
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new,
replacement, front bumper support.
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez")
is plainh King with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car.
10. For one thing, I have already stated what I know about the front bumper support.
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same,
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper
support allegedly needed had already been replaced!
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and
i i-_ _ _ i— rtlirio kv nmfAocuw»i ^vn^nViirp nnhodv can accurately price anything (neither

after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07.
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case
he makes therein (called

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) @ §3, §5, §6, §8,

§9, §10 on Pages 4-7, AND, based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car
in question, particularly in regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we
personally know and recall it to be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest
and testify under oath that to the very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry
has told this Court and stated therein is factually true.
13. Moreover, based upon my own professional knowledge and experience, when an
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two,
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is
capable of operating the car.
14« Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car
were really true - all that this wvKen Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this
world who would have passed the car for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I
personally know would have been required for Harry*s mandatory, by end-of-October deadline,
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers,
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repairs
wrere left pending and in 'limbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.00 or so
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repairs required to perfectly
restore Harry's car to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then
simultaneously painted, all at once. Cerlainlv. official reoonk 'M th<- ihuh <zt*i*> n^or+™<w „f

Motor Vehicles could confirm and verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this part of our statement,
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing
certifications,
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT.
EXECUTED ON

_, 2009.
BY

x
Dick
Declarant
x

BY:

Shannon
Declarant
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint
608 W. Center Street .
Midvale,UT 84047

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this
_day of
. 2009, by _
&
, signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me
that he/she executed the same.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT)
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for
Case #080903840.
TO:

Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111

DATED THIS j f £ ^ _ _ _ d a y of

/^ftfUX&^Cj

, 2009

miville, Jr., PRO SE
#172/
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020

